Professor Martha Nussbaum (Chicago) is listed by the Foreign Policy magazine amongst the Top 100 Global Thinkers.
"These are perilous times for liberal humanists like philosopher Martha Nussbaum, who find their craft besieged from all sides: by metrics-minded education reformers, by pundits and politicians fretting about U.S. competitiveness in the sciences and engineering, by university administrators faced with budget cuts and shrinking endowments, wondering whether they really need that historian of early Guatemalan kilns on the payroll.
Nussbaum, an eclectic scholar whose last book explored the theme of disgust as it related to the gay-marriage debate, thinks that they do. The liberal arts, Nussbaum argues in her latest book, Not for Profit, are essential to the development of empathy, tolerance, and critical thinking, traits and skills that don't translate easily into numbers but that are crucial for society. In the rush to retool the American education system in the image of an ever-more-cutthroat global economy, she worries, "values precious for the future of democracy … are in danger of getting lost.""
Martha Nussbaum is Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago. Her latest book is "Not For Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities" (Princeton University Press, 2010). See my post here.
Sunday, November 28, 2010
Thursday, November 25, 2010
Rainer Forst on Human Rights and Religion
In "Frankfurter Rundschau" (November 25, 2010), Professor Rainer Forst writes about human rights and religion:
"Der aufrechte Gang" [Walking upright]
Excerpts:
"Menschenrechte drücken Ansprüche aus, die kein Mensch anderen verweigern darf, wenn er sie als Personen anerkennt, die ein Recht darauf haben, nicht unterdrückt und illegitim beherrscht zu werden. Sie sind als Einsprüche gegen „unmenschliche“ und die „Menschenwürde“ verletzende Politiken und Herrschaftsstrukturen entstanden, und ihr ursprünglicher Sinn ist ein emanzipatorischer. Die Menschen-rechte haben den moralisch-politischen Sinn, Menschen das zu ermöglichen, was Ernst Bloch den „aufrechten Gang“ nannte."
"Der Universalismus ist zwar älter als das Christentum, denkt man etwa an die Lehren der Stoa, aber die vom Christentum geprägte politische Geschichte Europas stellt in der Tat den Kontext der Entwicklung der Menschenrechtsidee dar. Dabei aber muss man sehen, dass die heute oft vertretene Überzeugung, die Menschen-rechte seien eine „Errungenschaft“ des Christentums, irreführend ist. Sie waren eine Errungenschaft innerhalb des Christentums und zwar in der Regel gegen die herrschende Lehre. [......] Um es ganz verkürzt zu sagen, mussten die Dissidenten, die sich gegen eine „gottgewollte“ und religiös legitimierte Feudalherrschaft stellten, zunächst gewaltige hermeneutische und polemische Kraft aufwenden, um aus dem göttlichen Naturrecht von Gott gegebene Freiheitsrechte zu machen, um aus der Sorge um die Seele und den rechten Glauben die Gewissens- und Religionsfreiheit zu generieren und um die Idee der Gottesebenbildlichkeit so zu deuten, dass aus ihr eine Unantastbarkeit auch des Anders- und Ungläubigen wurde."
"Die Menschenrechte sprechen eine verbindliche Sprache der Moral, die sich partikular entwickelt hat; sie drücken zugleich aber auch eine allgemeine Wahrheit aus. Solange das Unrecht eine bestimmte Struktur hat, die überall auf der Welt angeprangert werden muss, solange muss auch die Moral eine solche haben. Niemand will in einer Welt leben, in der man erst eine heilige Schrift konsultieren muss, um herauszufinden, was moralisch richtig oder falsch ist."
Rainer Forst is Professor of Political Theory and Philosophy at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main. His books include "Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit" (1994) [English: "Contexts of Justice" (2002)], "Toleranz im Konflikt" (2003) and "Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung. Elemente einer konstruktivistischen Theorie der Gerechtigkeit" (2007) [An English translation is coming out on Columbia University Press.]
"Der aufrechte Gang" [Walking upright]
Excerpts:
"Menschenrechte drücken Ansprüche aus, die kein Mensch anderen verweigern darf, wenn er sie als Personen anerkennt, die ein Recht darauf haben, nicht unterdrückt und illegitim beherrscht zu werden. Sie sind als Einsprüche gegen „unmenschliche“ und die „Menschenwürde“ verletzende Politiken und Herrschaftsstrukturen entstanden, und ihr ursprünglicher Sinn ist ein emanzipatorischer. Die Menschen-rechte haben den moralisch-politischen Sinn, Menschen das zu ermöglichen, was Ernst Bloch den „aufrechten Gang“ nannte."
"Der Universalismus ist zwar älter als das Christentum, denkt man etwa an die Lehren der Stoa, aber die vom Christentum geprägte politische Geschichte Europas stellt in der Tat den Kontext der Entwicklung der Menschenrechtsidee dar. Dabei aber muss man sehen, dass die heute oft vertretene Überzeugung, die Menschen-rechte seien eine „Errungenschaft“ des Christentums, irreführend ist. Sie waren eine Errungenschaft innerhalb des Christentums und zwar in der Regel gegen die herrschende Lehre. [......] Um es ganz verkürzt zu sagen, mussten die Dissidenten, die sich gegen eine „gottgewollte“ und religiös legitimierte Feudalherrschaft stellten, zunächst gewaltige hermeneutische und polemische Kraft aufwenden, um aus dem göttlichen Naturrecht von Gott gegebene Freiheitsrechte zu machen, um aus der Sorge um die Seele und den rechten Glauben die Gewissens- und Religionsfreiheit zu generieren und um die Idee der Gottesebenbildlichkeit so zu deuten, dass aus ihr eine Unantastbarkeit auch des Anders- und Ungläubigen wurde."
"Die Menschenrechte sprechen eine verbindliche Sprache der Moral, die sich partikular entwickelt hat; sie drücken zugleich aber auch eine allgemeine Wahrheit aus. Solange das Unrecht eine bestimmte Struktur hat, die überall auf der Welt angeprangert werden muss, solange muss auch die Moral eine solche haben. Niemand will in einer Welt leben, in der man erst eine heilige Schrift konsultieren muss, um herauszufinden, was moralisch richtig oder falsch ist."
Rainer Forst is Professor of Political Theory and Philosophy at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main. His books include "Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit" (1994) [English: "Contexts of Justice" (2002)], "Toleranz im Konflikt" (2003) and "Das Recht auf Rechtfertigung. Elemente einer konstruktivistischen Theorie der Gerechtigkeit" (2007) [An English translation is coming out on Columbia University Press.]
Tuesday, November 23, 2010
Michael Walzer on Global and Local Justice (Video)
On November 16, Professor Michael Walzer gave a lecture at the NYU School of Law on:
“Global and Local Justice”
(Video; 1 hour 15 minutes)
Michael Walzer is co-editor of "Dissent". His books include "Just and Unjust Wars" (Basic Books, 1977), "Spheres of Justice" (Basic Books, 1983), "Interpretation and Social Criticism" (Harvard University Press, 1987), and "Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad" (University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).
During academic year 2010/2011, Professor Walzer will be a Fellow of the newly established Straus Institute for the Advanced Study of Law & Justice at the New York University School of Law.
“Global and Local Justice”
(Video; 1 hour 15 minutes)
Michael Walzer is co-editor of "Dissent". His books include "Just and Unjust Wars" (Basic Books, 1977), "Spheres of Justice" (Basic Books, 1983), "Interpretation and Social Criticism" (Harvard University Press, 1987), and "Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad" (University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).
During academic year 2010/2011, Professor Walzer will be a Fellow of the newly established Straus Institute for the Advanced Study of Law & Justice at the New York University School of Law.
Sunday, November 21, 2010
Recent journal articles on Jürgen Habermas
A selection from journals (summer and autumn 2010):
Nation State, Capitalism, Democracy: Philosophical and Political Motives in the Thought of Jürgen Habermas
STEFAN MÜLLER-DOOHM
European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 13 no. 4 (2010), pp. 443-457
Rawls and Habermas on the Cosmopolitan Condition
J. ANGELO CORLETT, MARK NORZAGARY & JEFFREY SHARPLESS
The Philosophical Forum, vol. 41 no. 4 (2010), pp. 459–477
Communicative Reason and Religion: The Case of Habermas
PIETER DUVENAGE
Sophia, vol. 49 no. 3 (2010), pp. 343-357
Zur (Un)Übersetzbarkeit religiöser Rede. Kritische Anmerkungen zu Habermas´ neuerer Religionsphilosophie
DIETRICH SCHOTTE
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, vol. 64 no. 3 (2010), pp. 378-392
Whose Europe Is It Anyway? Habermas's New Europe and its Critics
STEFAN AUER
Telos no. 152 (2010)
Zum Dialog zwischen Joseph Ratzinger und Jürgen Habermas
HANS ALBERT
Analyse & Kritik, vol. 17 no. 3 (2010)
Habermas and Ratzinger on the Future of Religion
MICHAEL WELKER
Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 63 no. 4 (2010), pp. 456-473
Jürgen Habermas and Islamic Fundamentalism: On the Limits of Discourse Ethics
VIVIENNE BOON
Journal of Global Ethics, vol. 6 no. 2 (2010), pp. 153-166
Habermas, Kantian Pragmatism, and Truth
STEVEN LEVINE
Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 36 no. 6 (2010), pp. 677-695
See my list of articles and books on Jürgen Habermas 2009-2010 here.
Nation State, Capitalism, Democracy: Philosophical and Political Motives in the Thought of Jürgen Habermas
STEFAN MÜLLER-DOOHM
European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 13 no. 4 (2010), pp. 443-457
Rawls and Habermas on the Cosmopolitan Condition
J. ANGELO CORLETT, MARK NORZAGARY & JEFFREY SHARPLESS
The Philosophical Forum, vol. 41 no. 4 (2010), pp. 459–477
Communicative Reason and Religion: The Case of Habermas
PIETER DUVENAGE
Sophia, vol. 49 no. 3 (2010), pp. 343-357
Zur (Un)Übersetzbarkeit religiöser Rede. Kritische Anmerkungen zu Habermas´ neuerer Religionsphilosophie
DIETRICH SCHOTTE
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, vol. 64 no. 3 (2010), pp. 378-392
Whose Europe Is It Anyway? Habermas's New Europe and its Critics
STEFAN AUER
Telos no. 152 (2010)
Zum Dialog zwischen Joseph Ratzinger und Jürgen Habermas
HANS ALBERT
Analyse & Kritik, vol. 17 no. 3 (2010)
Habermas and Ratzinger on the Future of Religion
MICHAEL WELKER
Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 63 no. 4 (2010), pp. 456-473
Jürgen Habermas and Islamic Fundamentalism: On the Limits of Discourse Ethics
VIVIENNE BOON
Journal of Global Ethics, vol. 6 no. 2 (2010), pp. 153-166
Habermas, Kantian Pragmatism, and Truth
STEVEN LEVINE
Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 36 no. 6 (2010), pp. 677-695
See my list of articles and books on Jürgen Habermas 2009-2010 here.
Saturday, November 20, 2010
Frankfurt lectures on "The Nature of Normativity"
Lecture series at Frankfurt University on "The Nature of Normativity":
December 1, 2010
Professor Robert Pippin (University of Chicago)
Reason's Form
December 8, 2010
Professor Christine Korsgaard (Harvard University)
The Normative Constitution of Agency
December 15, 2010
Professor Joseph Raz (Columbia University)
Normativity: what is it and how can it be explained?
January 12, 2011
Professor Thomas M. Scanlon (Harvard University)
Metaphysical Objections to Normative Truth
January 19, 2011
Professor Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh)
From German Idealism to American Pragmatism – and Back
February 16, 2011
Dr. Sabina Lovibond (University of Oxford)
Practical Reason and Character-Formation
Normativity is the most everyday phenomenon. Yet it poses major problems for philosophical analysis. It everydayness can be seen from the fact that, even though we are not directly forced to do so, we regard ourselves as bound by a variety of norms, values and rules in our thought and action – for instance social conventions of politeness, a professional ethos, bonds of friendship, promises that must be kept, right up to general moral norms. Even in the case of legally binding norms, different explanations are offered of the grounds of their validity. The central question concerning normativity is: What is the source of the binding power of such norms, values and rules? Is it based on instrumental considerations, social expectations, autonomous self-commitment or on a normative reality beyond the empirical world, which may be explicable only in metaphysical terms?
December 1, 2010
Professor Robert Pippin (University of Chicago)
Reason's Form
December 8, 2010
Professor Christine Korsgaard (Harvard University)
The Normative Constitution of Agency
December 15, 2010
Professor Joseph Raz (Columbia University)
Normativity: what is it and how can it be explained?
January 12, 2011
Professor Thomas M. Scanlon (Harvard University)
Metaphysical Objections to Normative Truth
January 19, 2011
Professor Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh)
From German Idealism to American Pragmatism – and Back
February 16, 2011
Dr. Sabina Lovibond (University of Oxford)
Practical Reason and Character-Formation
Normativity is the most everyday phenomenon. Yet it poses major problems for philosophical analysis. It everydayness can be seen from the fact that, even though we are not directly forced to do so, we regard ourselves as bound by a variety of norms, values and rules in our thought and action – for instance social conventions of politeness, a professional ethos, bonds of friendship, promises that must be kept, right up to general moral norms. Even in the case of legally binding norms, different explanations are offered of the grounds of their validity. The central question concerning normativity is: What is the source of the binding power of such norms, values and rules? Is it based on instrumental considerations, social expectations, autonomous self-commitment or on a normative reality beyond the empirical world, which may be explicable only in metaphysical terms?
Monday, November 15, 2010
Waldron on Religion and Public Deliberation
Professor Jeremy Waldron has posted a new paper on SSRN:
Two-Way Translation: The Ethics of Engaging with Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation
Abstract:
Using as an exemplar, the 2007 "Evangelical Declaration against Torture," this paper examines the role of religious argument in public life. The Declaration was drawn up by David Gushee, University Professor at Mercer University, and others. It argues for an absolute ban on the use of torture deploying unashamedly Christian rhetoric, some of it quite powerful and challenging. For example, it says: " [T]he Holy Spirit participates in human pathos with groans and sighs too deep for words. The cries of the tortured are in a very real sense, … the cries of the Spirit." The present paper considers whether there is any affront to the duties of political civility in arguing in these terms. There is a line of argument, associated with John Rawls's book, "Political Liberalism," suggesting that citizens should refrain from discussing issues of public policy in religious or deep-philosophical terms that are not accessible to other citizens. The present paper challenges the conception of inaccessibility on which this Rawlsian position is based. It argues, with Jurgen Habermas, that all sides in a modern pluralist society have a right to state their views as firmly and as deeply as they can, and all sides have the duty to engage with others, and to strain as well as they can to grasp others' meanings. It is not enough to simply announce that one can not understand religious reasons, especially if no good faith effort has been made, using the ample resources available in our culture, to try. Of course, many peoeple will not be convinced by the reasons that are offered in religious discourse; but to argue for their rejection - which is always what may happen in respectable political deliberation - is not to say that the presentation of those reasons was offensive or inappropriate.
(Thanks to Lawrence Solum for the pointer).
Jeremy Waldron is University Professor at New York University School of Law.
Jürgen Habermas's article on "Religion in the Public Sphere" is available here [pdf]. It is published in "European Journal of Philosophy" vol. 14, no. 1 (2006), pp. 1-25.
Two-Way Translation: The Ethics of Engaging with Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation
Abstract:
Using as an exemplar, the 2007 "Evangelical Declaration against Torture," this paper examines the role of religious argument in public life. The Declaration was drawn up by David Gushee, University Professor at Mercer University, and others. It argues for an absolute ban on the use of torture deploying unashamedly Christian rhetoric, some of it quite powerful and challenging. For example, it says: " [T]he Holy Spirit participates in human pathos with groans and sighs too deep for words. The cries of the tortured are in a very real sense, … the cries of the Spirit." The present paper considers whether there is any affront to the duties of political civility in arguing in these terms. There is a line of argument, associated with John Rawls's book, "Political Liberalism," suggesting that citizens should refrain from discussing issues of public policy in religious or deep-philosophical terms that are not accessible to other citizens. The present paper challenges the conception of inaccessibility on which this Rawlsian position is based. It argues, with Jurgen Habermas, that all sides in a modern pluralist society have a right to state their views as firmly and as deeply as they can, and all sides have the duty to engage with others, and to strain as well as they can to grasp others' meanings. It is not enough to simply announce that one can not understand religious reasons, especially if no good faith effort has been made, using the ample resources available in our culture, to try. Of course, many peoeple will not be convinced by the reasons that are offered in religious discourse; but to argue for their rejection - which is always what may happen in respectable political deliberation - is not to say that the presentation of those reasons was offensive or inappropriate.
(Thanks to Lawrence Solum for the pointer).
Jeremy Waldron is University Professor at New York University School of Law.
Jürgen Habermas's article on "Religion in the Public Sphere" is available here [pdf]. It is published in "European Journal of Philosophy" vol. 14, no. 1 (2006), pp. 1-25.
Sunday, November 14, 2010
Essays on "Pragmatism & Democracy"
The current issue of the Italian journal "Etica & Politica" (vol. 12, no. 1, 2010) contains a series of articles under the subtitle "Pragmatism and Democracy". All the articles are available online:
Roberto Frega & Fabrizio Trifirò
Guest Editors’ Preface [pdf]
Robert Talisse
Saving Pragmatist Democratic Theory (from Itself) [pdf]
Roberto Frega
What Pragmatism Means by Public Reason [pdf]
Gideon Calder
Pragmatism, Critical Theory and Democratic Inclusion [pdf]
Fabrizio Trifirò
The Importance of Pragmatism for Liberal Democracy: an Anti-foundationalist and Deliberative Approach to Multiculturalism [pdf]
Also see my posts on Robert Talisse's book on "Democracy and Moral Conflict" (Cambridge University Press, 2009) here and here.
Roberto Frega & Fabrizio Trifirò
Guest Editors’ Preface [pdf]
Robert Talisse
Saving Pragmatist Democratic Theory (from Itself) [pdf]
Roberto Frega
What Pragmatism Means by Public Reason [pdf]
Gideon Calder
Pragmatism, Critical Theory and Democratic Inclusion [pdf]
Fabrizio Trifirò
The Importance of Pragmatism for Liberal Democracy: an Anti-foundationalist and Deliberative Approach to Multiculturalism [pdf]
Also see my posts on Robert Talisse's book on "Democracy and Moral Conflict" (Cambridge University Press, 2009) here and here.
Friday, November 12, 2010
Philosophy & Human Rights: Some Contemporary Perspectives
David A. Reidy has posted a new paper on SSRN:
"Philosophy and Human Rights: Some Contemporary Perspectives"
Forthcoming in Claudio Corradetti (ed.) - Philosophical Dimensions of Human Rights (Springer, 2011).
David A. Reidy is Professor of Philosophy and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee. Reidy is currently working on three books on John Rawls:
- John Rawls: A Democratic Vision for the American Tradition.
- The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon. Co-edited with Jon Mandle.
- The Blackwell Companion to Rawls. Co-edited with Jon Mandle.
See also my post on David A. Reidy's paper on "Rawls's Religion and Justice".
"Philosophy and Human Rights: Some Contemporary Perspectives"
Forthcoming in Claudio Corradetti (ed.) - Philosophical Dimensions of Human Rights (Springer, 2011).
David A. Reidy is Professor of Philosophy and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee. Reidy is currently working on three books on John Rawls:
- John Rawls: A Democratic Vision for the American Tradition.
- The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon. Co-edited with Jon Mandle.
- The Blackwell Companion to Rawls. Co-edited with Jon Mandle.
See also my post on David A. Reidy's paper on "Rawls's Religion and Justice".
Thursday, November 11, 2010
Does religious pluralism require secularism?
The new issue of "The Hedgehog Review" (vol. 12 no. 3, 2010) addresses the question “Does religious pluralism require secularism?”
States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of Secularism
Rajeev Bhargava
The Meaning of Secularism
Charles Taylor
Rethinking Secularism
Craig Calhoun
States, Religious Diversity, and the Crisis of Secularism
Rajeev Bhargava
The Meaning of Secularism
Charles Taylor
Rethinking Secularism
Craig Calhoun
Interview with Amartya Sen (in German)
The November issue of the German monthly "Cicero" has an interview with professor Amartya Sen:
"Hoffnung ist nicht utopisch"
Excerpt:
Q: Ihnen gelingt es bei Ihrer Arbeit, einen sehr realistischen Blick auf die Welt zu werfen, ohne dabei das Utopische aus den Augen zu verlieren.
A: Ich glaube, dass Realismus weder das Ablehnen noch das Akzeptieren utopischer Visionen bedeutet. Vor ungefähr 30 Jahren habe ich ein Buch über den Sachverhalt geschrieben, dass Demokratien Hungersnöte verhindern. Und das, obwohl gerade mal fünf bis zehn Prozent der Bevölkerung davon betroffen sind, eine Minderheit also. Aber warum sind Demokratien dann so effektiv darin, Hungersnöte zu bekämpfen? Weil sie Informationen durch freie Medien verbreiten. Weil sich in ihnen eine Opposition bilden kann, die die Regierung unter Druck setzt. Das hat den Effekt, dass nicht nur die Betroffenen, sondern eine Mehrheit der Bevölkerung verlangt, dass es nicht zu einer Hungersnot kommen darf. Ein Resultat öffentlicher Diskussion also, nicht nur von Wahlen. Sie können die Auswirkungen eines solchen Denkens neuerdings in vielen Ländern Afrikas, Asiens und Lateinamerikas beobachten, die zu Demokratien geworden sind. Es ist also wichtig, zur Kenntnis zu nehmen, dass das, was Philosophen und Ökonomen wie ich machen, nicht irgendein utopisches Gerede ist. Zwar befindet sich in allem, was ich schreibe, ein Element der Hoffnung – aber diese Hoffnung ist keineswegs unrealistisch oder gar utopisch.
Amartya Sen is Lamont University Professor at Harvard University. His latest book "The Idea of Justice" (Harvard University Press, 2009) has been published in German by Beck Verlag,"Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit" (2010).
"Hoffnung ist nicht utopisch"
Excerpt:
Q: Ihnen gelingt es bei Ihrer Arbeit, einen sehr realistischen Blick auf die Welt zu werfen, ohne dabei das Utopische aus den Augen zu verlieren.
A: Ich glaube, dass Realismus weder das Ablehnen noch das Akzeptieren utopischer Visionen bedeutet. Vor ungefähr 30 Jahren habe ich ein Buch über den Sachverhalt geschrieben, dass Demokratien Hungersnöte verhindern. Und das, obwohl gerade mal fünf bis zehn Prozent der Bevölkerung davon betroffen sind, eine Minderheit also. Aber warum sind Demokratien dann so effektiv darin, Hungersnöte zu bekämpfen? Weil sie Informationen durch freie Medien verbreiten. Weil sich in ihnen eine Opposition bilden kann, die die Regierung unter Druck setzt. Das hat den Effekt, dass nicht nur die Betroffenen, sondern eine Mehrheit der Bevölkerung verlangt, dass es nicht zu einer Hungersnot kommen darf. Ein Resultat öffentlicher Diskussion also, nicht nur von Wahlen. Sie können die Auswirkungen eines solchen Denkens neuerdings in vielen Ländern Afrikas, Asiens und Lateinamerikas beobachten, die zu Demokratien geworden sind. Es ist also wichtig, zur Kenntnis zu nehmen, dass das, was Philosophen und Ökonomen wie ich machen, nicht irgendein utopisches Gerede ist. Zwar befindet sich in allem, was ich schreibe, ein Element der Hoffnung – aber diese Hoffnung ist keineswegs unrealistisch oder gar utopisch.
Amartya Sen is Lamont University Professor at Harvard University. His latest book "The Idea of Justice" (Harvard University Press, 2009) has been published in German by Beck Verlag,"Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit" (2010).
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
"Journal of Ethics" on G. A. Cohen
The latest issue of "Journal of Ethics" (volume 14, no. 3-4, December 2010) is devoted to the work of G. A. Cohen (1941–2009):
Editor-in-Chief’s Introduction (pdf)
J. Angelo Corlett
G. A. Cohen’s Vision of Socialism
Nicholas Vrousalis
Justice as Fairness: Luck Egalitarian, Not Rawlsian
Michael Otsuka
Relationships of Equality: A Camping Trip Revisited
Richard W. Miller
Jerry Cohen’s Why Not Socialism? Some Thoughts
John E. Roemer
Cohen’s Rescue
Jan Narveson
Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos Revisited
Jonathan Wolff
See my previous post on G. A. Cohen here, here, here and here.
Editor-in-Chief’s Introduction (pdf)
J. Angelo Corlett
G. A. Cohen’s Vision of Socialism
Nicholas Vrousalis
Justice as Fairness: Luck Egalitarian, Not Rawlsian
Michael Otsuka
Relationships of Equality: A Camping Trip Revisited
Richard W. Miller
Jerry Cohen’s Why Not Socialism? Some Thoughts
John E. Roemer
Cohen’s Rescue
Jan Narveson
Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos Revisited
Jonathan Wolff
See my previous post on G. A. Cohen here, here, here and here.
Monday, November 08, 2010
Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?
From Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (October 2010):
"Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?"
by Christie Hartley & Lori Watson
Abstract
"Is a feminist political liberalism possible? Political liberalism’s regard for a wide range of comprehensive doctrines as reasonable makes some feminists skeptical of its ability to address sex inequality. Indeed, some feminists claim that political liberalism maintains its position as a political liberalism at the expense of securing substantive equality for women. We claim that political liberalism’s core commitments actually restrict all reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine substantive equality for all, including women and other marginalized groups. In particular, we argue that political liberalism’s criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that eliminate social conditions of domination and subordination relevant to reasonable democratic deliberation among equal citizens and that the criterion of reciprocity requires the social conditions necessary for recognition respect among persons as equal citizens. As a result, we maintain that the criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that provide genuine equality for women along various dimensions of social life central to equal citizenship."
Christie Hartley is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University.
Lori Watson is Assistant Professor and Director of the Gender Studies Program, Department of Philosophy, University of San Diego.
"Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?"
by Christie Hartley & Lori Watson
Abstract
"Is a feminist political liberalism possible? Political liberalism’s regard for a wide range of comprehensive doctrines as reasonable makes some feminists skeptical of its ability to address sex inequality. Indeed, some feminists claim that political liberalism maintains its position as a political liberalism at the expense of securing substantive equality for women. We claim that political liberalism’s core commitments actually restrict all reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine substantive equality for all, including women and other marginalized groups. In particular, we argue that political liberalism’s criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that eliminate social conditions of domination and subordination relevant to reasonable democratic deliberation among equal citizens and that the criterion of reciprocity requires the social conditions necessary for recognition respect among persons as equal citizens. As a result, we maintain that the criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that provide genuine equality for women along various dimensions of social life central to equal citizenship."
Christie Hartley is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University.
Lori Watson is Assistant Professor and Director of the Gender Studies Program, Department of Philosophy, University of San Diego.
Saturday, November 06, 2010
Richard J. Arneson on "Luck Egalitarianism"
Forthcoming in Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska (eds.) - Responsibility and Distributive Justice (Oxford University Press, April 2011):
"Luck Egalitarianism - A Primer"
by Richard J. Arneson
Abstract:
"This essay surveys varieties of the luck egalitarian project in an exploratory spirit, seeking to identify lines of thought that are worth developing further and that might ultimately prove morally acceptable. I do not attend directly to the critics and assess their concerns; I have done that in other essays*. I do seek to identify some large fault lines, divisions in ways of approaching the task of constructing a theory of justice or of conceiving its substance. These are controversial in the sense that in the present state of discussion it is unclear how best to view them or to which side it is better to scramble. But in the end of course I’m not a moral geographer and map-maker, just an involved spectator/tourist offering yet another view of the cathedral."
*See Arneson's paper "Luck Egalitarianism Interpreted and Defended" (2006).
Richard J. Arneson is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego.
"Luck Egalitarianism - A Primer"
by Richard J. Arneson
Abstract:
"This essay surveys varieties of the luck egalitarian project in an exploratory spirit, seeking to identify lines of thought that are worth developing further and that might ultimately prove morally acceptable. I do not attend directly to the critics and assess their concerns; I have done that in other essays*. I do seek to identify some large fault lines, divisions in ways of approaching the task of constructing a theory of justice or of conceiving its substance. These are controversial in the sense that in the present state of discussion it is unclear how best to view them or to which side it is better to scramble. But in the end of course I’m not a moral geographer and map-maker, just an involved spectator/tourist offering yet another view of the cathedral."
*See Arneson's paper "Luck Egalitarianism Interpreted and Defended" (2006).
Richard J. Arneson is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego.
Thursday, November 04, 2010
New book: The Idea of the Public Sphere
The Idea of the Public Sphere: A Reader
Ed. by Jostein Gripsrud et. al.
(Lexington Books, 2010)
346 pages
Description
The notion of "the public sphere" has become increasingly central to theories and studies of democracy, media, and culture over the last few decades. It has also gained political importance in the context of the European Union's efforts to strengthen democracy, integration, and identity. The Idea of the Public Sphere offers a wide-ranging, accessible, and easy-to-use introduction to one of the most influential ideas in modern social and political thought, tracing its development from the origins of modern democracy in the Eighteenth Century to present day debates. This book brings key texts by the leading contributors in the field together in a single volume. It explores current topics such as the role of religion in public affairs, the implications of the internet for organizing public deliberation, and the transnationalisation of public issues.
Contents
Editors' Introduction
I: The Enlightenment and the Liberal Idea of the Public Sphere
Immanuel Kant: An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"
G.W.F. Hegel: Excerpt from Philosophy of Right
J.S. Mill: Excerpt On Liberty
II: "Mass Society", Democracy and Public Opinion
Walter Lippmann: Excerpt from The Phantom Public
John Dewey: Excerpt from The Public and its Problems
Joseph Schumpeter: Excerpt from Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Carl Schmitt: Excerpt from The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy
III: The Public Sphere Rediscovered
Hannah Arendt: Excerpt from The Human Condition
Jürgen Habermas: "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopaedia Article"
Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge: Excerpt from Public Sphere and Experience
Nancy Fraser: "Rethinking the Public Sphere"
IV: The Public Sphere and Models of Democracy
Jon Elster: "The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory"
Niklas Luhmann: "Societal Complexity and Public Opinion"
Jürgen Habermas: Excerpt from Between Facts and Norms
John Rawls: "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited"
V: Current Challenges
Bernhard Peters: "National and Transnational Public Spheres"
James Bohman: "Expanding Dialogue"
Chantal Mouffe: "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?"
Seyla Benhabib: Excerpt from The Claims of Culture
Jürgen Habermas: "Religion in the Public Sphere"
Jostein Gripsrud is Professor of Media Studies at the University of Bergen, Norway. He is the author of "Understanding Media Culture" (Oxford University Press, 2002) and co-editor of "Media, Markets and Public Spheres. European Media at the Crossroads" (The University of Chicago Press, 2010).
Tuesday, November 02, 2010
Two new papers by Jeremy Waldron
Professor Jeremy Waldron has posted two new papers on SSRN:
(1) Socioeconomic Rights and Theories of Justice
Abstract:
This paper considers the relation between theories of justice (like John Rawls’s theory) and theories of socio-economic rights. In different ways, these two kinds of theory address much the same subject-matter. But they are quite strikingly different in format and texture. Theories of socio-economic rights defend particular line-item requirements: a right to this or that good or opportunity (e.g., housing, health care, education, social security). Theories of justice tend to involve a more integrated normative account of a society’s basic structure (though they differ considerably among themselves in their structure). So how exactly should we think about their relation? The basic claim of the paper is that we should strive to bring these two into closer relation with one another, since it is only in the context of a theory of justice that we can properly assesses the competition that arises between claims of socio-economic right and other claims on public and private resources.
(2) Toleration and Calumny: Bayle, Locke, Montesquie and Voltaire on Religious Hate Speech
[Amnesty International Lecture, Oxford, May 12, 2010]
Abstract:
There is a considerable literature on the issue of hate speech. And there is a considerable literature on religious toleration (both contemporary and historic). But the two have not been brought into relation with one another. In this paper, I consider how the argument for religious toleration extends beyond a requirement of non-persection and non-establishment. I consider its application to the question of religious vituperation. The focus of the paper is on 17th and 18th century theories. Locke, Bayle and other Enlightenment thinkers imagined a tolerant society as a society free of hate speech: the kind of religious peace that they envisaged was a matter of civility not just non-persecution. The paper also considers the costs of placing limits (legal or social limits) on religious hate-speech: does this interfere with the forceful expression of religious antipathy which (for some people) the acceptance of their creed requires?
See my posts on Jeremy Waldron's 2009 Holmes Lectures on hate speech here and here.
Jeremy Waldron is University Professor at New York University School of Law.
(1) Socioeconomic Rights and Theories of Justice
Abstract:
This paper considers the relation between theories of justice (like John Rawls’s theory) and theories of socio-economic rights. In different ways, these two kinds of theory address much the same subject-matter. But they are quite strikingly different in format and texture. Theories of socio-economic rights defend particular line-item requirements: a right to this or that good or opportunity (e.g., housing, health care, education, social security). Theories of justice tend to involve a more integrated normative account of a society’s basic structure (though they differ considerably among themselves in their structure). So how exactly should we think about their relation? The basic claim of the paper is that we should strive to bring these two into closer relation with one another, since it is only in the context of a theory of justice that we can properly assesses the competition that arises between claims of socio-economic right and other claims on public and private resources.
(2) Toleration and Calumny: Bayle, Locke, Montesquie and Voltaire on Religious Hate Speech
[Amnesty International Lecture, Oxford, May 12, 2010]
Abstract:
There is a considerable literature on the issue of hate speech. And there is a considerable literature on religious toleration (both contemporary and historic). But the two have not been brought into relation with one another. In this paper, I consider how the argument for religious toleration extends beyond a requirement of non-persection and non-establishment. I consider its application to the question of religious vituperation. The focus of the paper is on 17th and 18th century theories. Locke, Bayle and other Enlightenment thinkers imagined a tolerant society as a society free of hate speech: the kind of religious peace that they envisaged was a matter of civility not just non-persecution. The paper also considers the costs of placing limits (legal or social limits) on religious hate-speech: does this interfere with the forceful expression of religious antipathy which (for some people) the acceptance of their creed requires?
See my posts on Jeremy Waldron's 2009 Holmes Lectures on hate speech here and here.
Jeremy Waldron is University Professor at New York University School of Law.
Reviews of Rawls's "Über Sünde, Glaube und Religion"
Two reviews of John Rawls's "Über Sünde, Glaube und Religion" (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010):
Marius Meller - "Eine einzige Verteidigung des Glaubens"
(Deutschlandsfunk, November 2, 2010)
Uwe Justus Wenzel - "Gewichtungen. John Rawls und die Religion"
(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 4, 2010)
See my previous post on the Rawls's book.
Marius Meller - "Eine einzige Verteidigung des Glaubens"
(Deutschlandsfunk, November 2, 2010)
Uwe Justus Wenzel - "Gewichtungen. John Rawls und die Religion"
(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 4, 2010)
See my previous post on the Rawls's book.
Monday, November 01, 2010
Samuel Freeman reviews Sen's "The Idea of Justice"
In "The New York Review of Books" (October 14, 2010), Professor Samuel Freeman reviews Amartya Sen's "The Idea of Justice" (Harvard University Press, 2009):
"A New Theory of Justice"
(subscription required)
Excerpts:
"Sen is mainly concerned with adressing existing injustices. He considers Rawls's ideal theory irrelevant for his purpose: for addressing injustices in the real world, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to know what a perfectly just society is. (....) To address real-world issues, we should assess and rank in order actual, realizable states of affairs from an impartial point of view, and then choose the best alternatives according to the degree that they embody justice and other important social values. Sen says that a precondition for reliability of our choices is that we engage in public reasoning with other impartial individuals.(....)
To contend that there is no need for ideal theory suggests that we should be satisfied with the alternatives currently on offer and haven't any reason to think about long-term or extensive reforms. The Whigs had no need of John Locke's radical social contract doctrine to justify the English Revolution of 1688. But Locke's main ideas - the people are sovereign; government originates in their content; government's power is fiduciary and exercisable only for the common good; citizens have inalienable rights justifying a right of resistance when violaled - supplied the conceptual frame for our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, and subsequently for many others. Whether ideal principles of justice are necessary depends upon one's aims and long-term perspective.
Even in the short term, ideal principles are often called upon to motivate people toward political reform. Consider the galvanizing effects of Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech. The aspirations King appealed to were grounded in political ideals and ideal principles and could not have been conveyed by focusing on practicable alternatives offered up by the status quo."
Samuel Freeman is Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of "Justice and the Social Contract. Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy" (Oxford University Press, 2006) and "Rawls" (Routledge, 2007). He is the editor of John Rawls's "Collected Papers" (Harvard University Press, 1999).
"A New Theory of Justice"
(subscription required)
Excerpts:
"Sen is mainly concerned with adressing existing injustices. He considers Rawls's ideal theory irrelevant for his purpose: for addressing injustices in the real world, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to know what a perfectly just society is. (....) To address real-world issues, we should assess and rank in order actual, realizable states of affairs from an impartial point of view, and then choose the best alternatives according to the degree that they embody justice and other important social values. Sen says that a precondition for reliability of our choices is that we engage in public reasoning with other impartial individuals.(....)
To contend that there is no need for ideal theory suggests that we should be satisfied with the alternatives currently on offer and haven't any reason to think about long-term or extensive reforms. The Whigs had no need of John Locke's radical social contract doctrine to justify the English Revolution of 1688. But Locke's main ideas - the people are sovereign; government originates in their content; government's power is fiduciary and exercisable only for the common good; citizens have inalienable rights justifying a right of resistance when violaled - supplied the conceptual frame for our Declaration of Independence and Constitution, and subsequently for many others. Whether ideal principles of justice are necessary depends upon one's aims and long-term perspective.
Even in the short term, ideal principles are often called upon to motivate people toward political reform. Consider the galvanizing effects of Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech. The aspirations King appealed to were grounded in political ideals and ideal principles and could not have been conveyed by focusing on practicable alternatives offered up by the status quo."
Samuel Freeman is Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of "Justice and the Social Contract. Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy" (Oxford University Press, 2006) and "Rawls" (Routledge, 2007). He is the editor of John Rawls's "Collected Papers" (Harvard University Press, 1999).