Monday, May 27, 2013

Jonathan Quong on Public Reason

Jonathan Quong has written an entry on "Public Reason" at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"Public Reason"

"Public reason requires that the moral or political rules that regulate our common life be, in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom the rules purport to have authority. It is an idea with roots in the work of Hobbes, Kant, and Rousseau, and has become increasingly influential in contemporary moral and political philosophy as a result of its development in the work of John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Gerald Gaus, among others. Proponents of public reason often present the idea as an implication of a particular conception of persons as free and equal. Each of us is free in the sense of not being naturally subject to any other person's moral or political authority, and we are equally situated with respect to this freedom from the natural authority of others. How, then, can some moral or political rules be rightly imposed on all of us, particularly if we assume deep and permanent disagreement amongst persons about matters of value, morality, religion, and the good life? The answer, for proponents of public reason, is that such rules can rightly be imposed on persons when the rules can be justified by appeal to ideas or arguments that those persons, at some level of idealization, endorse or accept."

Jonathan Quong is Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Manchester. He is the author of "Liberalism Without Perfection" (Oxford University Press, 2011). See my post on his book here.

(Thanks to Reza Javaheri for the pointer!)

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