by Alexander Kaufman
(Cambridge University Press, 2018)
This is a new interpretation and analysis of John Rawls's leading theory of distributive justice, which also considers the responding egalitarian theories of scholars such as Richard Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Ronald Dworkin, Martha Nussbaum, John Roemer, and Amartya Sen. Rawls's theory, Kaufman argues, sets out a normative ideal of justice that incorporates an account of the structure and character of relations that are appropriate for members of society viewed as free and equal moral beings. Forging an approach distinct amongst contemporary theories of equality, Rawls offers an alternative to egalitarian justice methodologies that aim primarily to compensate victims for undeserved bad luck. For Rawls, the values that ground the most plausible account of egalitarianism are real equality of economic opportunity combined with the guarantee of a fair distribution of social goods.
Part 1. Justification
1. Rawls's Practical Conception of Justice [preview]
2. Stability, Fit, and Consensus
3. Rawls and Ethical Constructivism
4. A Satisfactory Minimum Conception of Justice
Part 2. Democratic Equality
5. The Difference Principle: Cohen's Ambiguities
6. Justice as Fairness and Fair Equality of Opportunity
7. Democratic Equality
8. Ideal Theory and Practical Judgment
9. Poverty, Inequality, and Justice
Alexander Kaufman is Associate Professor of political science at the University of Georgia. He is the author of "Welfare in the Kantian State" (Oxford University Press, 1999). And he is the editor of "Capabilities Equality: Basic Issues and Problems" (Routledge, 2005) and of "Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage. G. A. Cohen's Egalitarianism" (Cambridge University Press, 2014).