Thomas Nagel on human rights and moral knowledge

In "London Review of Books" (June 3, 2021), Thomas Nagel revisits the old debate about consequentialist vs. deontological theories of morality:

"Types of Intuition. Thomas Nagel on human rights and moral knowledge"

"In some sense the moral point of view requires putting oneself in everyone else’s shoes and taking the separate point of view of each individual into account in deciding what to do. The question is: how?"

“The question I am asking is whether, looking at ourselves from outside, we should come to view our attachment to rights and deontology as an unnecessarily cluttered moral outlook.” 

Thomas M. Scanlon lecture on Tolerance

 Thomas M. Scanlon (Harvard) delivered the 2021 Knox Lecture on May 21, 2021:

"Further Reflections on Tolerance and its Difficulty" (video)

The lecture was based on Scanlon's paper "Further Reflections on Tolerance and Its Difficulty" (PDF, 2019),

Rainer Forst on Solidarity

* A new paper by Rainer Forst:

"Solidarity: Concept, Conceptions, and Contexts" (PDF, 2021)

Abstract:

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the concept of solidarity and distinguish various conceptions of solidarity that differ depending on social and normative contexts. The analysis helps to clarify both the different meanings of the term “solidarity” (and the different normative conceptions) and to avoid some of its pitfalls. The latter stem from making false connections between these conceptions, such as the assumption that solidarity must always be of an ethical or nationalist nature, that it is categorially different from justice or is always supererogatory. Solidarity as a virtue comes in many forms and with many justifications and grounds, and one must not reduce this plurality, but instead describe it properly. As already indicated, this opens up the possibility of conflicts between these contexts and dimensions of solidarity. The (as argued) “normatively dependent” concept of solidarity does not tell us to which form we ought to accord priority.

* Discussion: "Zukunft der Solidarität" (Video, May 12, 2021)

Rainer Forst (Frankfurt), Nicole Deitelhoff (Leipzig), Stefanie Dimmeler (Frankfurt), Klaus Günther (Frankfurt), & Jan Pieter Krahnen (Leipzig).

* "Dialektik der Solidarität" (Frankfurter Rundschau, May 28, 2021)

A Theory of Justice at Fifty: An Anniversary Conference

The University of Notre Dame is hosting a conference in September marking the 50th anniversary of the publication of John Rawls's "A Theory of Justice":

"A Theory of Justice at Fifty"  

Organized by Paul Weithman (University of Notre Dame)

Registration is now open!

Conference Schedule

Day 1, September 24

* Session 1: Method in Political Philosophy

Aaron James (UC, Irvine) and Laura Valentini (KCL/Munich)

* Session 2: Rawls, Race and Non-Ideal Theory

Charles Mills (CUNY), Tommie Shelby (Harvard), Henry Richardson (Georgetown)

* Session 3: Rawls and Equality

Elizabeth Anderson (Michigan) and Michael Otsuka (LSE & Rutgers) 

* Session 4: Rawls and Public Reason Liberalism

Jonathan Quong (USC), Rainer Forst (Frankfurt), Kevin Vallier (Bowling Green)

Day 2, September 25

* Session 5: Rawls and the History of Political Philosophy

Daniel Brudney (Chicago), Sharon Lloyd (USC), Peter DeMarneffe (Arizona State)

* Session 6: Rawls and Moral Philosophy

Stephen Darwall (Yale) and Susan Neiman (Berlin)

* Session 7: Rawls and Democracy

Joshua Cohen (Berkeley & Apple) and David Estlund (Brown Univeristy)

* Session 8: A Theory of Justice vs. Political Liberalism

Samuel Scheffler (NYU) and Japa Pallikkathayil (Pittsburgh)

* Closing Panel: "What Can We Hope?"

Chair: Paul Weithman (Notre Dame); Speakers: Samuel Freeman (Penn), Erin Kelly (Tufts), Leif Wenar (Stanford)

See also my blog posts:

* John Rawls's lectures on Modern Political Philosophy (audio recordings)

* John Rawls's lectures on John Stuart Mill (audio recordings)

* John Rawls. Debating the Major Questions

* John Rawls at 100.

Neues Buch: Theologische Reaktionen auf "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie"

Wissen und Glauben. Theologische Reaktionen auf das Werk von Jürgen Habermas "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie"

Hrsg. von Franz Gruber & Markus Knapp

(Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 2021)

254 Seiten

Kurzbeschreibung

In seinem großen Spätwerk "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie" rekonstruiert Jürgen Habermas den Diskurs über Glauben und Wissen, aus dem nicht zuletzt die säkulare Welt resultiert. Ob und wie dieser Diskurs weitergehen kann, um die Moderne vor Entgleisungen zu bewahren, ist allerdings fraglich. Der Band setzt sich aus theologischer Perspektive kritisch und nach vorne gerichtet mit dem Werk auseinander. In einem eigenen Text antwortet Jürgen Habermas auf die Beiträge.

Inhalt 

Franz Gruber & Markus Knapp - "Einführung"

Markus Knapp - "Schwacher Naturalismus und Transzendenz. Theologische Überlegungen zu Jürgen Habermas' Rekonstruktion des Diskurses über Grauben und Wissen", 

Martin Breul - "Rede vom Handeln Gottes im nachmetaphysischen Denken, oder: Lässt sich mit Habermas Theologie treiben?"

Franz Gruber - "Problemanzeigen für eine Systematische Theologie im Anschluss an Jürgen Habermas' Befund der Trennung von Glauben und Wissen"

Martin Dürnberger - "Vernünftige Freiheit, vernünftiger Glaube. Über Glaubensbegriffe und Lernprozesse"

Hans-Joachim Höhn - "Religion - Ritus - Transzendenz. Lebensdienliche Illusionen?"

Saskia Wendel - "Die Unausdenkbarkeit der Verzweiflung. Theologische Anknüpfung an und Unterscheidung von Habermas' nachmetaphyscher Interpretation Kantischer Metaphysik"

Matthias Lutz-Bachmann - "Hoffnung aus Vernunft. Kants Hoffnung auf ein "ethisches Gemeinwesen"

Magnus Striet - "Verzweiflungsanalysen und der opake Kern der Religion. Jürgen Habermas liest Søren Kierkegaard"

Jürgen Habermas - "Versuch einer Replik"

Habermas turns down Sheikh Zayed Book Award

In a statement published in "Der Spiegel Online" Jürgen Habermas turns down the Sheikh Zayed Book Award: "The Cultural Personality of the Year" for 2021 (225.000 Euro).

"I declared my willingness to accept this year's Sheikh Zayed Book Award. That was a wrong decision, which I correct hereby. I didn't sufficiently make clear to myself the very close connection of the institution, which awards these prizes in Abu Dhabi, with the existing political system there."

Comments:

* Andreas Fanizadh - “Eine überfällige Kontroverse”

* Moritz Baumstieger - "Jürgen Habermas und die Emirate: Sehr enttäuscht"

* Dietmar Pieper - "Der 91-Jährige, der beweglich blieb und Nein sagte"

* Reinhard Schulze - "Eine Lanze für den Diskurs"

* Stefan Weidner - "Abu Dhabi möchte sich auf die Aufklärung berufen“

* Christian Weisflog - "Habermas ist doch kein nützlicher Idiot"

* "Reaktionen auf Habermas' Verzicht auf Sheikh Zayed Book Award"

Among the previous award winners are: Richard van Leeuwen (NL), Philip Kennedy (UK), Jaroslav & Suzanne Stetkevych (USA), Dag Nikolaus Hasse (DE), David Wirmer (DE), Sugita Hideaki (JAP), Pedro Martinez Montavez (ES), and Denys Johnson-Davies (CAN).

Juergen Boos, President of the Frankfurt Book Fair, is member of the scientific commitee.

Symposium II on "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie"

The new issue of "Constellations" (vol. 28, no. 1 ) features articles on Jürgen Habermas' "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie" (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2019):

Jürgen Habermas - "An Author's Retrospective View" [first page] (Originally published in "Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie", vol. 69, no. 2 (2021), pp. 231-240.)

Thomas McCarthy - "On the Interest of Practical Reason in Hope"

Rainer Forst - "The Autonomy of Autonomy: On Jürgen Habermas's "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie"" [open access]

Cristina Lafont - "Remarks of a Young Habermasian on Jürgen Habermas’ "Also a History of Philosophy""

Seyla Benhabib - "Habermas's new "Phenomenology of Spirit": Two Centuries After Hegel

Peter E. Gordon - "Is There an Asymmetry Problem in the Genealogy of Postmetaphysical Reason?"

Maeve Cooke - "Existentially Lived Truth or Communicative Reason? Habermas’ Critique of Kierkegaard"

Eduardo Mendieta - "Enlightened Religion: The Alphabetization of Faith and the Linguistification of Freedom"

Jürgen Habermas - "Reply" [first page]

Cambridge Companion to Rorty

The Cambridge Companion to Rorty

ed. by David Rondel

(Cambridge University Press, 2021)

349 pages

Description

This Companion provides a systematic introductory overview of Richard Rorty's philosophy. With chapters from an interdisciplinary group of leading scholars, the volume addresses virtually every aspect of Rorty's thought, from his philosophical views on truth and representation and his youthful obsession with wild orchids to his ruminations on the contemporary American Left and his prescient warning about the election of Donald Trump. Other topics covered include his various assessments of classical American pragmatism, feminism, liberalism, religion, literature, and philosophy itself. Sympathetic in some cases, in others sharply critical, the essays will provide readers with a deep and illuminating portrait of Rorty's exciting brand of neo-pragmatism.

Contents [Preview]

Introduction: The Unity of Richard Rorty’s Philosophy - David Rondel [Preview] [Excerpt]

1. Rorty’s Metaphilosophy: A Pluralistic Corridor - Colin Koopman

2. After Metaphysics: Eliminativism and the Protreptic Dilemma - Neil Gascoigne

3. Rorty and Classical Pragmatism - Christopher Voparil

4. A Pragmatism More Ironic Than Pragmatic - Barry Allen

5. Rorty and Semantic Minimalism - Simon Blackburn

6. Returning to the Particular: Morality and the Self after Rorty - Alan Malachowski

7. Rorty’s Political Philosophy - Michael Bacon & Alexis Dianda

8. Tinkering with Truth, Tinkering with Difference: Rorty and (Liberal) Feminism - Susan Dieleman

9. Rorty’s Insouciant Social Thought - James T. Kloppenberg

10. Rorty and National Pride - Georgia Warnke

11. Rorty on Religion - Stephen S. Bush

12. Rorty: Reading Continental Philosophy - Paul Patton

13. Rorty’s Literary Culture: Reading, Redemption, and The Heart’s Invisible Furies - Áine Mahon & Elizabeth O’Brien [Abstract]

14. Wild Orchids - Robert Westbrook

See also my blog post on "On Philosophy and Philosophers. Unpublished Papers, 1960–2000" by Richard Rorty.

Symposium on "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie"

The new issue of "Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie" features articles on Jürgen Habermas' "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie" (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2019):

Robin Celikates - "Einleitung" [link] [preview]

Jürgen Habermas - "Rückblick eines Autors" [preview]

This essay is a reflection on what I hoped to achieve with a project that was in the making for more than ten years. The account probably illustrates the aims that I believe I should have pursued in the project looking back upon it today rather than what I actually achieved within it; in any case, what one has actually written is only revealed after the fact from the critical responses of attentive and sensitive readers.

Axel Honneth - "Säkulare Vernunft? Eine kleine Rückfrage an ein großes Buch" [preview]

In my contribution I ask whether the version of secular reason Jürgen Habermas characterises as “post-metaphysical” can really provide us children of modernity with a comprehensive self- and world-understanding. I begin by asking what it means to claim that secular reason is “post-metaphysical” (1). There are various possible ways of understanding this characterisation, some stronger than others; but there needs to be clarity on this issue to address my second question: What would secular reason really have to achieve in order to make good on its claim that it can still provide us with a comprehensive understanding of our relation both to ourselves and to the world? I will split this question along two dimensions: from a theoretical standpoint we should explore how reality has to be understood in order to allow us to attain a consistent understanding of self and world; from a practical standpoint, we need to ask which attitudes we would actually have to adopt towards reality in order to find in it the kind of orientation that Habermas believes his version of secular reason holds in store (2). In a third step, I follow up on these practical considerations by asking whether, at the level of everyday praxis, an orienting conception of self and world in this day and age does not in fact demand more than Habermas seems to have in mind (3). Finally, and returning, albeit indirectly, to the meaning of “post-metaphysical”, I cast some doubt on the Habermasian thesis that secular reason can survive only in the form of a tradition that reaches back either to Kant or to Hume; I want to question whether this division is exhaustive and briefly bring a third alternative into play (4).

Peter E. Gordon - "Gibt es ein Asymmetrie-Problem in der Genealogie der nachmetaphysischen Vernunft?" [preview]

This essay places some conceptual pressure on the model of a “learning process” in Jürgen Habermas’s Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie, and it asks whether this model introduces a subtle asymmetry into the relationship between religion and secular philosophy. Such an asymmetry would seem to obtain insofar as religious tradition is granted a privileged or unique status as the source of normative insights that are then available for rational scrutiny and translation into secular life. The essay also draws a comparison between Lessing and Habermas: Lessing, like Habermas, saw revelation as a source of instruction for humanity, and affirmed that religion could thereby play a role in the Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts. But Lessing was careful to say that no valuable normative contents are found in religion that could not also be derived by secular reason alone. Habermas’s genealogy of post-metaphysical thinking does not seem to confirm Lessing’s idea; instead, it appears to confirm an asymmetry in the relation between religion and secular philosophy.

Regina Kreide & Tilo Wesche - "Warum moralisch sein?" [preview]

In his latest book, Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie, Jürgen Habermas attempts nothing less than a reconceptualisation of the history of human reason. Why, according to the central question that runs through the book like a red thread, can we, in the face of all social adversities and psychological obstacles, still be morally motivated to stand up for overcoming injustice in the world? This almost classic question about what I can hope for undoubtedly bears Kantian traits. And yet Habermas clearly goes beyond Kant. We argue that this becomes visible, first, in his post-metaphysical conception of motivation, which links individual and collective moral learning processes. The enormous explosive power of this conception comes into its own, secondly, especially against the background of some additional assumptions (trust, grief, open future). Nevertheless, thirdly, the question arises to what extent the Habermasian narrative of progress does not have a blind spot because it is in some sense not dialectical enough. The negative side of reason, which Adorno and Benjamin emphasised, are not included in the progress narrative, or only indirectly, which makes the conception of moral motivation seem weaker than it ought to be.

Jürgen Habermas - "Replik" [preview]

With these comments I try to explain why I am not quite convinced by the objections of four colleagues who touch on relevant issues of great weight. Axel Honneth claims that I failed to take into account the systematic weight of the Aristotelian tradition which I pursue only up until Thomas Aquinas (1). Peter Gordon points to an asymmetry in the presentation of the discourse between faith and knowledge that allegedly calls into question the independence of what philosophy developed, by its own standards, from an appropriation of semantic contents of religious traditions (2). Regina Kreide and Tilo Wesche explain the central intention that in fact guided me in this book, but criticise the one-sidedness of an undialectical account of learning processes, in whose shadow the victims tend to be neglected (3).

Neues Buch: "Normative Ordnungen"

Normative Ordnungen

Hrsg. von Rainer Forst & Klaus Günther

(Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2021)

683 Seiten

Kurzbeschreibung

Wer verstehen will, wie gesellschaftliche Ordnungen sich herausbilden, verändern, stabilisieren oder zerbrechen, muss ihr normatives Innenleben erschließen. Der Frankfurter Forschungsverbund "Normative Ordnungen" hat eine viel beachtete Methode entwickelt, die die konstitutiven Rechtfertigungen nationaler wie transnationaler Ordnungen untersucht: ihre narrative Struktur, ihre moralische, religiöse, konventionelle, politische, rechtliche Natur – oder eine Kombination davon, so spannungsreich sie auch sein mag. Auf welchen Wegen, in welchen Verfahren und Konflikten entstehen solche Rechtfertigungen? Wann schwindet ihre Kraft? Der Band präsentiert in interdisziplinärer Zusammenarbeit eine Antwort auf diese Fragen.

Inhalt

Rainer Forst & Klaus Günther - Normative Ordnungen. Ein Frankfurter Forschungsprogramm [Leseprobe]

I: Die Ambivalenz normativer Ordnungen: Was gilt?

Jürgen Habermas - Noch einmal: Zum Verhältnis von Moralität und Sittlichkeit [Vortragsskript] [Video]

Axel Honneth - Recht und Sittlichkeit. Aspekte eines komplexen Wechselverhältnisses

Rainer Forst - Normativität und Wirklichkeit. Zu einer  kritisch-realistischen Theorie der Politik [Normativity and Reality (draft)]

Marcus Willaschek - Soziale Geltung und normative Richtigkeit. Eine  sozial-pragmatische Konzeption von Normativität

Christoph Menke - Zweite Natur. Zu einer kritischen Theorie der Normativität

Martin Saar - Immanente Normativität

Christopher Daase & Nicole Deitelhoff - Wenn die Geltung schwindet. Die Krise der liberalen  Weltordnung und die Herrschaftsproblematik internationaler Politik

II: Die Universalität normativer Ordnungen: Was gilt wo?

Nikita Dhawan - Die Aufklärung vor den Europäer-innen retten

Bernhard Jussen - Kohärenzinseln. Arbeiten an geschichtswissenschaftlichen  Versuchsaufbauten nach dem Ende des Eurozentrismus

Stefan Gosepath - Die Notwendigkeit globaler Philosophie

Matthias Lutz-Bachmann - Werte und Normen

Stefan Kadelbach - Die relative Universalität der Menschenrechte

Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Goldmann & Ingo Venzke - Gemeinwohl im Völkerrecht. Eine Theorie internationaler öffentlicher Gewalt

Jens Steffek - Vom Friedensprojekt zur Elitenverschwörung. Die Umdeutung internationalen Regierens in Zeiten des Populismus

III: Die Performativität normativer Ordnungen: Wer erzählt was und wie?

Hartmut Leppin - Normative Ordnung, Exemplarität und Performanz. Das Beispiel Rabbulas von Edessa

Annette Imhausen - (Natur-)Wissenschaften und normative Ordnungen. Beispiele  aus den frühesten Wissenschaften und ihrer Geschichte [Sciences and Normative Orders]

Susanne Schröter - Dschihadismus. Politische Kontexte, theologische  Rechtfertigungen und Utopien normativer Ordnungen

Mamadou Diawara - "Die Piraten versuchen, ihren Kopf zu retten". Chronik einer Transplantation, die nicht greift

Angela Keppler & Martin Seel - Filmische Untersuchungen. Über die Deutung  ihres seismographischen Gehalts

Vinzenz Hediger - Sichtbares Unrecht. Zur normativen Kraft des Dokumentarischen

Rainer Klump & Pascal Wolf - Das "Trickle Down"-Narrativ als Rechtfertigung  wirtschaftlichen Wachstums

IV: Die Dynamik und Fragilität normativer Ordnungen: Wer ordnet was?

Klaus Günther - Von normativen zu smarten Ordnungen? [Vortrag]

Christoph Burchard - Von der "Strafrechts"ordnung der Prädiktionsgesellschaft zur Strafrechts"Ordnung" des liberalen Rechtsstaats

Alexander Peukert - Die Herausbildung der normativen Ordnung "geistiges Eigentum". Diskurstheoretische und andere Erklärungsansätze [Arbeitspapier]

Ute Sacksofsky - Wenn Rechtfertigungen brüchig werden. Verfassungsgerichte in der Diskriminierungsbekämpfung am Beispiel der Geschlechterordnung vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht

Sighard Neckel - Der Zerfall von Ordnungen [Vortrag] 

Darrel Moellendorf - Hoffnung und Gründe [Hope and Reason]

Vier Kommentare zu Habermas’ "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie"

Trostlose Vernunft?

Vier Kommentare zu Jürgen Habermas’ Konstellation von Philosophie und Geschichte, Glauben und Wissen

von Burkhard Liebsch & Bernhard H. F. Taureck

(Felix Meiner Verlag, 2021)

247 Seiten

Kurzbeschreibung

Philosophie spendet keinen Trost und garantiert keine Versöhnung, lehrt Habermas in seinem jüngsten Werk "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie". Bedarf derart ernüchtertes Wissen eines funktional komplementären Glaubens, wie es in Habermas’ Rückgriffen auf die Philosophiegeschichte den Anschein hat?

Habermas bekennt sich wie Hegel zur "prinzipiellen Trostlosigkeit" philosophischen Denkens, verzichtet aber auch auf Glücks-, Sinn- oder Erlösungsversprechen. Er legt einen weiten Weg der Ernüchterung zurück. Burkhard Liebsch und Bernhard H. F. Taureck gehen in vier historisch und sozialphilosophisch ausgerichteten, reichhaltigen Kommentaren den Stationen dieser Ernüchterung nach und verdeutlichen, welche Potenziale Habermas' eigentümliche Konfiguration von Glauben und Wissen, Philosophie und Geschichte opfert.

Inhalt [PDF]

Vorwort  [PDF]

1. Geschichtliche Perspektiven "heil"-loser Vernunft. Jürgen Habermas’ implizite Geschichtsphilosophie – und was sie vermissen lässt - Burkhard Liebsch

2. Philosophie und religiöser Glaube. Versuch weiterführender Überlegungen in Auseinandersetzung mit Jürgen Habermas - Bernhard H. F. Taureck

3. Rückhaltlos verweltlicht? Philosophie vor ihrer Auflösung oder Verwirklichung - Burkhard Liebsch

4. Beantwortung der Frage: Welche verborgene Rolle spielt Habermas’ demokratisches Projekt in seinem "Opus magnum" von 2019? - Bernhard H. F. Taureck

Pragmatism and Epistemic Democracy

The new issue of "Raisons Politiques" (2021/1) features articles on "Pragmatism and Epistemic Democracy", edited by Annabelle Lever and Dominik Gerber:

* Introduction - Annabelle Lever, Dominik Gerber

* Pragmatism, Truth, and Democracy - Cheryl Misak & Robert B. Talisse

There is growing interest in deliberative democracy, especially the pragmatist version that argues that democratic freedoms and procedures are more likely to get us to the right view of what is true, just, or right. In this time in our history, a focus on truth is more important than ever. We (Robert Talisse and Cheryl Misak) have put forward a position on which we can justify democratic freedoms and procedures on the basis of epistemic reasons. Our very practices of belief and reasoning require that we regard each other as social equals and that the voices of all are taken seriously in our quest for truth. Lever and Chin, in a way that is broadly sympathetic to our general project, have expressed a worry that we are “wrong to suppose that epistemic considerations are better placed than moral considerations when justifying coercive power over others”. In response, we will first distinguish two sites where an epistemic justification of democracy might operate. On our view, the epistemic argument shows why we should be democrats, and the question of how democrats can justify the exercise of coercion is a different matter. We argue that the appropriate reasons we as a society give to justify coercive power over others will indeed be moral. Our point has always been that beliefs about what it is morally right to do must be responsive to reasons, if they are beliefs that are aimed at getting things right. Then the argument for democracy comes in: the best method for getting things right is, broadly speaking, a democratic one. But the reasons that will be in play will be reasons about equality, autonomy, utility, and so on.

* Democracy and Truth - Annabelle Lever

According to Misak and Talisse, we can get from the fact that we all take what we believe to be true, whatever our different and incompatible beliefs, to reasons to support democratic, as opposed to undemocratic, government. Hence, they claim that democracy is necessary, but not sufficient, for epistemically justified belief. This article clarifies and sceptically assesses these claims.

* The Pragmatist Demos and the Boundary Problem - Matthew Festenstein

The pragmatist argument that a democratic ethos and institutions are in some sense a form of inquiry remains one of the most powerful but elusive themes in its social and political thought. As a term and concept, democracy predates the modern state but the project of justifying democracy is paradigmatically a project of justifying it within and for the modern state. Drawing on Misak and Talisse’s important development of the inquiry argument, this article draws out how the pragmatist epistemic argument breaks with this traditional conception of democratic justification, and how its commitment to the removal of internal obstacles to epistemic inclusion provides general reasons to question political boundaries.

* Democracy and Epistemic Egalitarianism - Dominik Gerber

Because of its non-instrumentalism, Cheryl Misak’s and Robert Talisse’s Peircean theory of democratic justification constitutes a unique and important variety of epistemic democracy. At its core is the claim that democracy is a constituent component of the Peircean epistemic ideal of inquiry. This article offers a relational egalitarian reading of this ideal and argues that Peircean epistemic egalitarianism fails to provide unambiguous support for our commitment to uphold politically egalitarian institutions. It cautions against using conceptual affinities between democratic equality, the self-reflexivity it enables among citizens, and worthwhile epistemic relationships as a basis for justifying democracy.

* The Paradoxes of Democratic Voting and the Peircean Justification of Democracy - Valeria Ottonelli

The Peircean defence of democracy purports to ground the appeal of democratic government on universal epistemic interests that we simply have qua individual epistemic agents. The problem with this view is that it seems to obliterate the distinctive way in which democratic deliberation and decision making socialise our knowledge and beliefs, making democracy a very special epistemic game, quite different from the games that we play as individual knowers in non-political, non-democratic contexts. The shortcomings of the Peircean defence of democracy fully emerge when confronted with the paradoxes of democratic voting, which can only be overcome if we model the democratic processes of deliberation and belief formation as deeply collectivised and socialised. Thus, the neglect of the distinctive way in which democratic deliberation and decision making socialise knowledge grounds the Peircean defence of democracy on an inaccurate account of democracy’s epistemology, and leaves it helpless before the paradoxes of majoritian voting.

* Epistemic Democracy Without Truth: The Deweyan Approach [Paper] - Michael Fuerstein

In this essay I situate John Dewey’s pragmatist approach to democratic epistemology in relation to contemporary “epistemic democracy”. Like epistemic democrats, Dewey characterizes democracy as a form of social inquiry. But whereas epistemic democrats suggest that democracy aims to “track the truth”, Dewey rejects the notion of “tracking” or “corresponding” to truth in political and other domains. For Dewey, the measure of successful decision-making is not some fixed independent standard of truth or correctness but, instead, our own reflective satisfaction with the practical results. I argue that this approach better reconciles epistemic democracy with traditional models of popular authority (“the will of the people”) and bolsters the defenses of the epistemic democrat against elitist alternatives.

See also:

"Pragmatist Epistemology and Democratic Theory" by Cheryl Misak & Robert Talisse (Journal of Political Philosophy, 22, 3 (2014), pp. 366-376.