Jonathan Quong has written an entry on "Public Reason" at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"Public Reason"
Excerpt
"Public reason requires that the moral or political rules that regulate our common life be, in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom the rules purport to have authority. It is an idea with roots in the work of Hobbes, Kant, and Rousseau, and has become increasingly influential in contemporary moral and political philosophy as a result of its development in the work of John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Gerald Gaus, among others. Proponents of public reason often present the idea as an implication of a particular conception of persons as free and equal. Each of us is free in the sense of not being naturally subject to any other person's moral or political authority, and we are equally situated with respect to this freedom from the natural authority of others. How, then, can some moral or political rules be rightly imposed on all of us, particularly if we assume deep and permanent disagreement amongst persons about matters of value, morality, religion, and the good life? The answer, for proponents of public reason, is that such rules can rightly be imposed on persons when the rules can be justified by appeal to ideas or arguments that those persons, at some level of idealization, endorse or accept."
Jonathan Quong is Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Manchester. He is the author of "Liberalism Without Perfection" (Oxford University Press, 2011). See my post on his book here.
(Thanks to Reza Javaheri for the pointer!)
Monday, May 27, 2013
Thursday, May 23, 2013
Essays on Honneth's "Das Recht der Freitheit"
The new issue of "Krisis: Journal for Contemporary Philosophy" (2013 no, 1) features essays on Axel Honneth's lastest book "Das Recht der Freitheit" (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2011) and a reply by Honneth:
René Gabriels
In Search of a Critical Theory of World Society [pdf]
Thomas Nys
Which Justice, Whose Pathology? [pdf]
Beate Rössler
Kantian Autonomy and its Social Preconditions [pdf]
Joel Anderson
The Fragile Accomplishment of Social Freedom [pdf]
Bert van den Brink
From Personal Relations to the Rest of Society [pdf]
Rutger Claassen
Justice: Constructive or Reconstructive? [pdf]
Yolande Jansen
The ‘Us' of Democratic Will-Formation and Globalization [pdf]
Axel Honneth
Replies [pdf]
René Gabriels
In Search of a Critical Theory of World Society [pdf]
Thomas Nys
Which Justice, Whose Pathology? [pdf]
Beate Rössler
Kantian Autonomy and its Social Preconditions [pdf]
Joel Anderson
The Fragile Accomplishment of Social Freedom [pdf]
Bert van den Brink
From Personal Relations to the Rest of Society [pdf]
Rutger Claassen
Justice: Constructive or Reconstructive? [pdf]
Yolande Jansen
The ‘Us' of Democratic Will-Formation and Globalization [pdf]
Axel Honneth
Replies [pdf]
Sunday, May 19, 2013
Dworkin on "A New Philosophy for International Law"
The latest issue of "Philosophy and Public Affairs" (2013 no. 1) features an article by the late Ronald Dworkin:
"A New Philosophy for International Law" [pdf]
"A New Philosophy for International Law" [pdf]
Saturday, May 18, 2013
The reconciliation of Habermas and Derrida in 1999-2000
Benoît Peeters's biography "Derrida" (Polity Press, 2013) contains a short description of the reconciliation of Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas in 1999-2000:
"As he grew older and the thought of death obsessed him more, Derrida seemed eager to come to a rapprochement with some of his former adversaries. In October 1999, in New York, he again met Jürgen Habermas at the home of their common friend Giovanna Barradori. At this unexpected encounter, Habermas had the ‘smiling kindness’ to propose that he and Derrida hold a discussion. Derrida accepted immediately: ‘It’s high time,’ he said, ‘let’s not wait until it’s too late.’ The meeting took place in Paris shortly afterwards. During a friendly lunch, Habermas did all in his power to ‘wipe out the traces of the previous polemic, with an exemplary probity’ for which Derrida would always be grateful. The two men had not been on good terms for over twelve years, because of the two ‘unfair and hasty’ chapters that Habermas had written on Derrida in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity and Derrida’s stinging response in Mémoires: For Paul de Man and Limited Inc. [......] For Derrida, the quarrel with Habermas had had serious consequences: since the mid-1980s, access to the most important German publishers had been blocked, and his influence in the German-speaking world had been greatly hampered.
Their rapprochement was initially brought about on political terrain. Even during the years when they had been at odds, they had frequently been signing the same petitions and the same manifestoes. Derrida later acknowledged this in a fine homage that he wrote for the seventy-fifth birthday of his former enemy: ‘I had always had more than just sympathy, but an admiring approval for the argued positions that Habermas had adopted in Germany itself, on problems in German history, on numerous occasions.’
In 2000, Habermas and Derrida organized a seminar together in Frankfurt on problems in the philosophy of law, ethics, and politics. Alexander García Düttmann remembers the disquiet that this ‘reconciliation’ spread among the disciples of the two philosophers. ‘This rapprochement irritated me. Philosophically, they had nothing to say to one another. But politically, okay, they agreed on several points. Also, we shouldn’t underestimate tactical considerations. Derrida could be very trenchant, but he could also be a skilled negotiator when the occasion called for it. Depending on the context, he could be radical or almost consensual, courageous or calculating.’ Avital Ronell confirms that this episode caused their respective associates some heart-searching: ‘One could write an entire history of great men or women [. . .] and their disciples, a history of associations or dissociations, of gravitational pull. [. . .] Small groups quarrel and suddenly their leader, Mafi alike, perhaps, proposes a truce.’ One thing is certain: making up with Habermas meant that Derrida quickly reassumed a position in Germany that he had lost. Several plans for translation and re-publication saw the light. But other factors also helped to thaw the situation. After many years spent in the United States, Werner Hamacher, a follower of Derrida, had returned to teach in Frankfurt in 1998; he soon invited Derrida there, to give the lecture ‘The university without condition’. On this occasion, Derrida met up with Bernd Stiegler – not to be confused with Bernard Stiegler –, who had attended his seminar in Paris a few years earlier and now had an important position with the great publisher Suhrkamp. The Adorno Prize would soon seal Derrida’s reconciliation with Germany." ["Derrida", p. 501f].
In 2003 Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida published together "A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe".
"As he grew older and the thought of death obsessed him more, Derrida seemed eager to come to a rapprochement with some of his former adversaries. In October 1999, in New York, he again met Jürgen Habermas at the home of their common friend Giovanna Barradori. At this unexpected encounter, Habermas had the ‘smiling kindness’ to propose that he and Derrida hold a discussion. Derrida accepted immediately: ‘It’s high time,’ he said, ‘let’s not wait until it’s too late.’ The meeting took place in Paris shortly afterwards. During a friendly lunch, Habermas did all in his power to ‘wipe out the traces of the previous polemic, with an exemplary probity’ for which Derrida would always be grateful. The two men had not been on good terms for over twelve years, because of the two ‘unfair and hasty’ chapters that Habermas had written on Derrida in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity and Derrida’s stinging response in Mémoires: For Paul de Man and Limited Inc. [......] For Derrida, the quarrel with Habermas had had serious consequences: since the mid-1980s, access to the most important German publishers had been blocked, and his influence in the German-speaking world had been greatly hampered.
Their rapprochement was initially brought about on political terrain. Even during the years when they had been at odds, they had frequently been signing the same petitions and the same manifestoes. Derrida later acknowledged this in a fine homage that he wrote for the seventy-fifth birthday of his former enemy: ‘I had always had more than just sympathy, but an admiring approval for the argued positions that Habermas had adopted in Germany itself, on problems in German history, on numerous occasions.’
In 2000, Habermas and Derrida organized a seminar together in Frankfurt on problems in the philosophy of law, ethics, and politics. Alexander García Düttmann remembers the disquiet that this ‘reconciliation’ spread among the disciples of the two philosophers. ‘This rapprochement irritated me. Philosophically, they had nothing to say to one another. But politically, okay, they agreed on several points. Also, we shouldn’t underestimate tactical considerations. Derrida could be very trenchant, but he could also be a skilled negotiator when the occasion called for it. Depending on the context, he could be radical or almost consensual, courageous or calculating.’ Avital Ronell confirms that this episode caused their respective associates some heart-searching: ‘One could write an entire history of great men or women [. . .] and their disciples, a history of associations or dissociations, of gravitational pull. [. . .] Small groups quarrel and suddenly their leader, Mafi alike, perhaps, proposes a truce.’ One thing is certain: making up with Habermas meant that Derrida quickly reassumed a position in Germany that he had lost. Several plans for translation and re-publication saw the light. But other factors also helped to thaw the situation. After many years spent in the United States, Werner Hamacher, a follower of Derrida, had returned to teach in Frankfurt in 1998; he soon invited Derrida there, to give the lecture ‘The university without condition’. On this occasion, Derrida met up with Bernd Stiegler – not to be confused with Bernard Stiegler –, who had attended his seminar in Paris a few years earlier and now had an important position with the great publisher Suhrkamp. The Adorno Prize would soon seal Derrida’s reconciliation with Germany." ["Derrida", p. 501f].
In 2003 Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida published together "A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe".
Paper on Deliberative Democracy & Its Poststructuralist Critics
The latest issue of the journal "Javnost - The Public" (2013, no. 1) features an article by Lincoln Dahlberg on the theory of deliberative democracy:
"Exclusions of the Public Sphere Conception: Examining Deliberative and Discourse Theory Accounts" [pdf]
Abstract
The deliberative conception of the public sphere has proven popular in the critical evaluation of the democratic role of media and communication. However, the conception has come under sustained critique from poststructuralist- influenced theorists, amongst others, for failing to fully account for the exclusions that result from it being defined as a universal norm of public sphere deliberation. This paper examines how this critique may be answered. It does so first by exploring how (sophisticated) deliberative theory can reply to the critique, and second by turning to the poststructuralist-influenced critics – specifically post-Marxist discourse theorists – and asking how they might provide a way forward. With respect to the first, the paper finds that deliberative theory can, and often does, account for the exclusions in question much more than critics suggest, but that there remains concern about the conception’s radical democratic status given that exponents (seem to) derive it extra-politically. With respect to the second, the paper finds that a post-Marxist discourse theory reading – that embraces radical contingency – of the deliberative public sphere conception provides a purely political framework for theorising deliberative exclusion (and associated politics), and thus offers an ontological and democratic radicalisation of the public sphere conception. However, given the embrace of radical contingency, and thus acceptance of inelminable power, the paper concludes by indicating that this radicalisation may illicit concern about its radical democratic status.
Lincoln Dahlberg is Visiting Fellow at the Center for Critical and Cultural Studies, The University of Queensland.
"Exclusions of the Public Sphere Conception: Examining Deliberative and Discourse Theory Accounts" [pdf]
Abstract
The deliberative conception of the public sphere has proven popular in the critical evaluation of the democratic role of media and communication. However, the conception has come under sustained critique from poststructuralist- influenced theorists, amongst others, for failing to fully account for the exclusions that result from it being defined as a universal norm of public sphere deliberation. This paper examines how this critique may be answered. It does so first by exploring how (sophisticated) deliberative theory can reply to the critique, and second by turning to the poststructuralist-influenced critics – specifically post-Marxist discourse theorists – and asking how they might provide a way forward. With respect to the first, the paper finds that deliberative theory can, and often does, account for the exclusions in question much more than critics suggest, but that there remains concern about the conception’s radical democratic status given that exponents (seem to) derive it extra-politically. With respect to the second, the paper finds that a post-Marxist discourse theory reading – that embraces radical contingency – of the deliberative public sphere conception provides a purely political framework for theorising deliberative exclusion (and associated politics), and thus offers an ontological and democratic radicalisation of the public sphere conception. However, given the embrace of radical contingency, and thus acceptance of inelminable power, the paper concludes by indicating that this radicalisation may illicit concern about its radical democratic status.
Lincoln Dahlberg is Visiting Fellow at the Center for Critical and Cultural Studies, The University of Queensland.
Friday, May 17, 2013
Interview with James Gordon Finlayson
At the "3:AM Magazine" (May 17, 2013), Richard Marshall interviews James Gordon Finlayson on
Habermas, Adorno, Politics
Excerpt
The debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls "concerns their respective political theories. It is basically a dispute between Rawls’s theory of Political Liberalism, and Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law. It is not primarily a dispute between Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, and Habermas Discourse Ethics. Principle (U) is the central idea in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics, which is a moral theory, not a theory of law or of democratic legitimacy, while the argument from the Original Position takes a back seat in Rawls’s Political Liberalism. People who interpret the Habermas Rawls dispute in the light of the contrast between Habermas’s principle (U) and Rawls’s Original Position, are looking at the wrong thing and so miss the real points of dispute.
What people should have been asking is this. What are the central organizing ideas of their respective political theories, and on what significant points do these ideas conflict? To my mind the real point of dispute concerns their different conception of the political and of democratic legitimacy. According to Rawls “ the liberal principle of legitimacy” implies that legitimate laws, laws whose enforcement is properly justified to those who must live under them, may not appeal to principles and ideas insofar as they form part of any comprehensive philosophical or moral doctrine, but only insofar as they form part of an overlapping consensus of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. For various reasons, Habermas has to deny this. For one thing, he maintains that morality, that is principle (U) and the norms it validates, constrain what can count as legitimate law. Habermas claims at various places that that legitimate laws must “harmonize with the universal principles of justice and solidarity”. More precisely he writes that “a legal order can be legitimate only if it does not contradict basic moral principles.” Whatever way you look at it Habermas’s conception of morality (and his theory of Discourse Ethics) is what Rawls would call comprehensive moral (or philosophical) doctrines. The fact that Habermas calls his theory ‘proceduralist’ is irrelevant. After all he claims that substantive moral norms, namely all those norms that are validated by the procedure – namely discourse in conformity to (U) – constrain legitimate laws on pain of giving rise to cognitive dissonance (between moral and legal demands). There are other important differences too. Habermas allows that conceptions of the good may be germane to the justification of legitimate law, a claim that Rawls again, must deny. Finally, Rawls is right to claim that Habermas’s conception of legitimacy is comprehensive, at least in one obvious sense: it presupposes that a controversial philosophical theory is true, namely discourse ethics."
James Gondon Finlayson is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sussex. He is the authour of "A Very Short Introduction to Habermas" (Oxford University Press, 2005) and co-editor (with Fabian Freyenhagen) of "Habermas and Rawls. Disputing the Political" (Routledge, 2011).
Habermas, Adorno, Politics
Excerpt
The debate between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls "concerns their respective political theories. It is basically a dispute between Rawls’s theory of Political Liberalism, and Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law. It is not primarily a dispute between Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, and Habermas Discourse Ethics. Principle (U) is the central idea in Habermas’s Discourse Ethics, which is a moral theory, not a theory of law or of democratic legitimacy, while the argument from the Original Position takes a back seat in Rawls’s Political Liberalism. People who interpret the Habermas Rawls dispute in the light of the contrast between Habermas’s principle (U) and Rawls’s Original Position, are looking at the wrong thing and so miss the real points of dispute.
What people should have been asking is this. What are the central organizing ideas of their respective political theories, and on what significant points do these ideas conflict? To my mind the real point of dispute concerns their different conception of the political and of democratic legitimacy. According to Rawls “ the liberal principle of legitimacy” implies that legitimate laws, laws whose enforcement is properly justified to those who must live under them, may not appeal to principles and ideas insofar as they form part of any comprehensive philosophical or moral doctrine, but only insofar as they form part of an overlapping consensus of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. For various reasons, Habermas has to deny this. For one thing, he maintains that morality, that is principle (U) and the norms it validates, constrain what can count as legitimate law. Habermas claims at various places that that legitimate laws must “harmonize with the universal principles of justice and solidarity”. More precisely he writes that “a legal order can be legitimate only if it does not contradict basic moral principles.” Whatever way you look at it Habermas’s conception of morality (and his theory of Discourse Ethics) is what Rawls would call comprehensive moral (or philosophical) doctrines. The fact that Habermas calls his theory ‘proceduralist’ is irrelevant. After all he claims that substantive moral norms, namely all those norms that are validated by the procedure – namely discourse in conformity to (U) – constrain legitimate laws on pain of giving rise to cognitive dissonance (between moral and legal demands). There are other important differences too. Habermas allows that conceptions of the good may be germane to the justification of legitimate law, a claim that Rawls again, must deny. Finally, Rawls is right to claim that Habermas’s conception of legitimacy is comprehensive, at least in one obvious sense: it presupposes that a controversial philosophical theory is true, namely discourse ethics."
James Gondon Finlayson is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sussex. He is the authour of "A Very Short Introduction to Habermas" (Oxford University Press, 2005) and co-editor (with Fabian Freyenhagen) of "Habermas and Rawls. Disputing the Political" (Routledge, 2011).
Thursday, May 16, 2013
The Habermas/Streeck debate on democracy & Europe
In "Die Zeit" (May 16, 2013), Thomas Assheuer writes on the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Wolfgang Streeck on democracy and Europe:
"Das böse Spiel"
[Update: now available online]
Excerpts
"In der Zeitschrift Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik liefern sich der Philosoph Jürgen Habermas und der Soziologe Wolfgang Streeck einen Schlagabtausch (Heft 4 und 5/13), der den Leser mit glasklaren Alternativen konfrontiert: Habermas will das Projekt Europa fortführen und fordert seine "Vertiefung", weil ohne eine starke Gemeinschaft die kleinen Boote der nationalen Demokratie im Meer der Globalisierung untergehen müssten. Für Streeck, der seine Haltung in seinem Buch Gekaufte Zeit (Suhrkamp Verlag) ausführlich begründet, ist es genau umgekehrt. Er möchte lieber heute als morgen aus dem Euro aussteigen und das "frivole Experiment" am offenen Herzen der "Staatsvölker" beenden. Europa werde die Demokratie nicht retten, sondern abschaffen. "Die Demokratie, wie wir sie kennen, ist auf dem Weg, vom Kapitalismus abgetrennt und um seinetwillen auf eine Kombination von Rechtsstaat und öffentlicher Unterhaltung reduziert zu werden." [.....]
"Habermas wittert bei Streeck einen linken Kommunitarismus, den er mit den europaischen Linksparteien teile. Doch diese seien drauf und dran, ihren "historischen Fehler aus dem Jahre 1914 zu wiederholen". Anstatt offensiv für Europa zu streiten, knickten sie "aus Furcht vor der rechtspopulistischen Mitte ein". In Deutschland bestärke eine "unsäglich merkelfromme Medienlandschaft" alle darin, "das heisse Eisen der Europapolitik" nicht anzufassen und Angela Merkels "clever-boses Spiel" aus Beschweigen und "Dethematisierung" mitzuspielen. Habermas setzt auf Polarisierung, wobei sich alle Seiten allerdings eingestehen sollten, dass es "weder risikolose noch kostenlose Alternativen gibt". Deshalb sei der neuen Partei Alternative für Deutschland Erfolg zu wünschen. "Ich hoffe, dass es ihr gelingt, die anderen Parteien zu nötigen, ihre europapolitischen Tarnkappen abzustreifen" – und sich zu entscheiden. Denn es gebe nur ein Land, das die "institutionelle Vertiefung der EU" vorantreiben könne: Deutschland.
See my post on Jürgen Habermas's article in Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik no. 5/2013 here.
See also Arno Widmann’s report in ”Frankfurter Rundschau”.
Update:
Thomas Meyer's article on the Habermas/Streeck controversy in "Frankfurter Hefte" no. 7/8, 2013.
"Das böse Spiel"
[Update: now available online]
Excerpts
"In der Zeitschrift Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik liefern sich der Philosoph Jürgen Habermas und der Soziologe Wolfgang Streeck einen Schlagabtausch (Heft 4 und 5/13), der den Leser mit glasklaren Alternativen konfrontiert: Habermas will das Projekt Europa fortführen und fordert seine "Vertiefung", weil ohne eine starke Gemeinschaft die kleinen Boote der nationalen Demokratie im Meer der Globalisierung untergehen müssten. Für Streeck, der seine Haltung in seinem Buch Gekaufte Zeit (Suhrkamp Verlag) ausführlich begründet, ist es genau umgekehrt. Er möchte lieber heute als morgen aus dem Euro aussteigen und das "frivole Experiment" am offenen Herzen der "Staatsvölker" beenden. Europa werde die Demokratie nicht retten, sondern abschaffen. "Die Demokratie, wie wir sie kennen, ist auf dem Weg, vom Kapitalismus abgetrennt und um seinetwillen auf eine Kombination von Rechtsstaat und öffentlicher Unterhaltung reduziert zu werden." [.....]
"Habermas wittert bei Streeck einen linken Kommunitarismus, den er mit den europaischen Linksparteien teile. Doch diese seien drauf und dran, ihren "historischen Fehler aus dem Jahre 1914 zu wiederholen". Anstatt offensiv für Europa zu streiten, knickten sie "aus Furcht vor der rechtspopulistischen Mitte ein". In Deutschland bestärke eine "unsäglich merkelfromme Medienlandschaft" alle darin, "das heisse Eisen der Europapolitik" nicht anzufassen und Angela Merkels "clever-boses Spiel" aus Beschweigen und "Dethematisierung" mitzuspielen. Habermas setzt auf Polarisierung, wobei sich alle Seiten allerdings eingestehen sollten, dass es "weder risikolose noch kostenlose Alternativen gibt". Deshalb sei der neuen Partei Alternative für Deutschland Erfolg zu wünschen. "Ich hoffe, dass es ihr gelingt, die anderen Parteien zu nötigen, ihre europapolitischen Tarnkappen abzustreifen" – und sich zu entscheiden. Denn es gebe nur ein Land, das die "institutionelle Vertiefung der EU" vorantreiben könne: Deutschland.
See my post on Jürgen Habermas's article in Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik no. 5/2013 here.
See also Arno Widmann’s report in ”Frankfurter Rundschau”.
Update:
Thomas Meyer's article on the Habermas/Streeck controversy in "Frankfurter Hefte" no. 7/8, 2013.
Wednesday, May 15, 2013
Interview with Philip Pettit on Republican Theory
At "New Books Network", Robert Talisse interviews Philip Pettit on his latest book "On The People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy" (Cambridge University Press, 2012):
Interview with Philip Pettit [audio, 1 hour & 10 minutes]
Interview with Philip Pettit [audio, 1 hour & 10 minutes]
Tuesday, May 14, 2013
Neues Buch: Eine Deliberative Theorie des Gerechten und Guten
Was is gerecht? Was ist gut?
Eine Deliberative Theorie des Gerechten und Guten
von Nadia Mazouz
(Velbrück Verlag, 2013)
464 S.
Kurzbeschreibung
Dieses Buch bietet eine breit angelegte Analyse von Gerechtigkeit und ihrem Verhältnis zum Guten. Anders als weithin üblich werden allgemeine Gerechtigkeit und Verteilungsgerechtigkeit in einem Zuge bearbeitet. Der Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf deliberativen Theorien der Gerechtigkeit. Diesen zufolge erlangen Gerechtigkeitsaussagen Gültigkeit durch Prozesse des Überlegens, die in der richtigen Weise mit den Überlegungen derjenigen, für die sie Orientierung sollen bieten können, verbunden sind. Diese allgemeine Charakterisierung der Grundidee deliberativer Gerechtigkeit zu einer Theorie auszubuchstabieren, erfordert eine Vielzahl von speziellen Bestimmungen bezüglich dessen, was Gerechtigkeits-aussagen sind, wie und wen sie orientieren können sollen, sowie: was Überlegungen sind und wie sie beschaffen sein müssen, um zu gültigen Aussagen zu kommen. Die Autorin setzt sich insbesondere mit den Theorien von John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon und Jürgen Habermas auseinander.
Eine konsequent deliberative Theorie ist, so Nadia Mazouz, erst mit einer deliberativen Theorie der Gerechtigkeit und des Guten erreicht. Eine halbierte deliberative Theorie, wie sie von den kritisierten Autoren vertreten wird, ist mit charakteristischen Setzungen behaftet, die den deliberativen Kern gefährden. Daher schlägt Mazouz vor, den Bezug des Gerechten zum Guten in einem vierten Modell – dem Perspektivenmodell – zu beschreiben. In diesem sind das Gerechte und das Gute Perspektiven auf das zu Beurteilende, wobei typischerweise Handlungen oder Institutionen beurteilt werden: Gerechtigkeit und das gute Leben sind nicht Bereiche mit unterschiedlichen Gegenständen, sie sind Weisen, Überlegungen zu beurteilen: als Überlegungen, in denen die Überlegungen anderer eine bestimmte Rolle spielen oder auch nicht, es sind Perspektiven, aus denen heraus Überlegungen beurteilt werden.
Inhalt [pdf]
Vorwort [pdf]
Einleitung
1. Was ist Gerechtigkeit?
2. Deliberative Theorien allgemeiner Gerechtigkeit: Kontraktualismus und Diskursethik
3. Theorien spezieller Gerechtigkeit: Verteilungs- versus Tauschgerechtigkeit
4. Betrachtungen zu einer deliberativen Theorie des Gerechten und Guten
Nadia Mazouz ist wissenschaftliche Assistentin am Lehrstuhl für Praktische Philosophie von Lutz Wingert an der ETH Zürich. Dissertation: "Aspekte einer deliberativen Theorie des Guten und Gerechten" (2009) [pdf].
Monday, May 13, 2013
Studies in Social & Political Thoughts (Winter 2012)
The latest issue of "Studies in Social & Political Thoughts" features papers from a conference on "Forms of Domination and Emancipation" and two interesting papers on John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas:
"How to Understand Rawls’s Law of Peoples"
by Veljko Dubljevic
"Through the Eyes of Habermas: The Heritage of Liberalism and Deliberative Politics"
by Stephanie Morrow
The issue can be downloaded here.
"How to Understand Rawls’s Law of Peoples"
by Veljko Dubljevic
"Through the Eyes of Habermas: The Heritage of Liberalism and Deliberative Politics"
by Stephanie Morrow
The issue can be downloaded here.
Monday, May 06, 2013
New Book: "Human Rights - The Hard Questions"
Human Rights
The Hard Questions
Ed. by Cindy Holder & David Reidy
(Cambridge University Press, May 2013)
488 pages
Description
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. A burgeoning human rights movement followed, yielding many treaties and new international institutions and shaping the constitutions and laws of many states. Yet human rights continue to be contested politically and legally and there is substantial philosophical and theoretical debate over their foundations and implications. In this volume, distinguished philosophers, political scientists, international lawyers, environmentalists and anthropologists discuss some of the most difficult questions of human rights theory and practice: what do human rights require of the global economy? Does it make sense to secure them by force? What do they require in jus post bello contexts of transitional justice? Is global climate change a human rights issue? Is there a human right to democracy? Does the human rights movement constitute moral progress? For students of political philosophy, human rights, peace studies and international relations.
Contents
Introduction - Cindy Holder & David Reidy
Part I. What are Human Rights?
1. Human Rights and Human Nature - Chris Brown
2. Universalism and Particularism in Human Rights - Neil Walker
3. Are Human Rights Universal? - Rex Martin
Part II. How do Human Rights Relate to Group Rights and Culture?
4. The Significance of Cultural Difference for Human Rights - Alison Dundes Renteln
5. Groups and Human Rights - Peter Jones
6. Entangled: Family, Religion and Human Rights [video] - Ayelet Shachar
7. What does Cultural Difference Require of Human Rights? - Claudio Corradetti
Part III. What do Human Rights Require of the Global Economy?
8. What do Human Rights Require of the Global Economy? - Adam McBeth
9. Universal Human Rights in the Global Political Economy - Tony Evans
10. Human Rights and Global Equal Opportunity - Ann Cudd
Part IV. How do Human Rights Relate to Environmental Policy?
11. Human Rights in a Hostile Climate - Stephen M. Gardiner
12. A Human Rights Approach to Energy, Poverty and Gender Inequality - Gail Karlsson
13. Pollution Wolves in Scientific Sheep's Clothing - Kristin Shrader-Frechette
Part V. Is There a Human Right to Democracy?
14. Is There a Human Right to Democracy? - Hilary Charlesworth
15. The Human Right to Democracy and its Global Import - Carol Gould
16. An Egalitarian Argument for a Human Right to Democracy - Thomas Christiano
Part VI. What are the Limits of Rights Enforcement?
17. Is it ever Reasonable for One State to Invade Another for Humanitarian Reasons? - Julie Mertus
18. Conflicting Responsibilities to Protect Human Rights - Larry May
19. Searching for the Hard Questions about Women's Human Rights - Marysia Zalewski
20. Are Human Rights Possible after Conflict? - Margaret Akello & Erin Baines
Part VII. Are Human Rights Progressive?:
21. Moral Progress and Human Rights - Allen Buchanan
22. Human Rights and Moral Agency - Mark Goodale
23. Gender Mainstreaming Human Rights - Laura Parisi
Cindy Holder is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Victoria, British Columbia.
David Reidy is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee.
Sunday, May 05, 2013
William Outhwaite reviews Ulrich Beck's "German Europe"
At "LSE Reviews of Books" Professor William Outhwaite reviews Ulrich Beck's new book on "German Europe" (Polity Press, 2013):
Book Review: German Europe
William Outhwaite finds Beck’s book to be rich in ideas, but questions whether the responsibility for austerity policies should be specifically ascribed to Germany.
See also my post on Ulrich Beck's discussion with Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Mary Kaldor at the LSE on March 21: "German Europe: Are there Alternatives?" (video podcast).
Book Review: German Europe
William Outhwaite finds Beck’s book to be rich in ideas, but questions whether the responsibility for austerity policies should be specifically ascribed to Germany.
See also my post on Ulrich Beck's discussion with Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Mary Kaldor at the LSE on March 21: "German Europe: Are there Alternatives?" (video podcast).
Thursday, May 02, 2013
Richard Arneson on Political Liberalism and Religious Liberty
New paper by Richard Arneson on political liberalism and religion:
"Political Liberalism, Religious Liberty, and Religious Establishment"
[Forthcoming in Hanoch Dagan, Shahar Lifshitz, & Yedidia Z. Stern (eds.) - "The Role of Religion in Human Rights Discourse"].
Abstract
What stance toward religion does a just state maintain? This essay outlines and defends an answer to this question that is associated with the slogan calling for the separation of church and state. The defense consists of knocking down bad defenses and merely gesturing toward a better one. But even if this hint of a defense can be successfully developed, it will only go so far. Toward the end of the essay, an objection is raised that is not susceptible to decisive refutation and that can be properly engaged only by case by case adjudication seeking best policies for current actual circumstances. The issue in play here arises from the consideration that, despite the fact that it would be morally desirable to achieve a certain goal, it does not follow that any attempted movement toward achieving that goal would be morally desirable in any and all circumstances.
Richard Arneson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego.
"Political Liberalism, Religious Liberty, and Religious Establishment"
[Forthcoming in Hanoch Dagan, Shahar Lifshitz, & Yedidia Z. Stern (eds.) - "The Role of Religion in Human Rights Discourse"].
Abstract
What stance toward religion does a just state maintain? This essay outlines and defends an answer to this question that is associated with the slogan calling for the separation of church and state. The defense consists of knocking down bad defenses and merely gesturing toward a better one. But even if this hint of a defense can be successfully developed, it will only go so far. Toward the end of the essay, an objection is raised that is not susceptible to decisive refutation and that can be properly engaged only by case by case adjudication seeking best policies for current actual circumstances. The issue in play here arises from the consideration that, despite the fact that it would be morally desirable to achieve a certain goal, it does not follow that any attempted movement toward achieving that goal would be morally desirable in any and all circumstances.
Richard Arneson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego.
Habermas on Democracy and Capitalism (Book Review)
"Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik" (May 2013) features an extensive review by Jürgen Habermas of Wolfgang Streeck's latest book "Gekaufte Zeit" (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2013).
The review is titled "Demokratie oder Kapitalismus. Vom Elend der nationalstaatlichen Fragmentierung in einer kapitalistisch integrierten Weltgesellschaft" (Blätter, pp. 59-70).
Excerpts
"In seinem Buch über die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus entwickelt Wolfgang Streeck eine schonungslose Analyse der Entstehungs-geschichte der gegenwärtigen, auf die Realwirtschaft durchschlagenden Banken- und Schuldenkrise. [.....] Den Ausgangspunkt bildet die berechtigte Kritik an der von Claus Offe und mir Anfang der 70er Jahre entwickelten Krisentheorie. Der damals vorherrschende keynesianische Steuerungs-optimismus hatte uns zu der Annahme inspiriert, dass sich die politisch beherrschten wirtschaftlichen Krisenpotentiale in widersprüchliche Imperative an einen überforderten Staatsapparat und in "kulturelle Widersprüche des Kapitalismus" (wie es Daniel Bell einige Jahre später formulierte) verschieben und in der Gestalt einer Legitimationskrise äußern würden. Heute begegnen wir (noch ?) keiner Legitimations-, aber einer handfesten Wirtschaftskrise."
"Mit dem Besserwissen des historisch zurückblickenden Beobachters beginnt Wolfgang Streeck seine Darstellung des Krisenverlaufs mit einer Skizze des sozialstaatlichen Regimes, das im Nachkriegseuropa bis zum Beginn der 70er Jahre aufgebaut worden war. Darauf folgen die Phasen der Durchsetzung der neoliberalen Reformen, die ohne Rücksicht auf soziale Folgen die Verwertungs-bedingungen des Kapitals verbessert und dabei stillschweigend die Semantik des Ausdrucks „Reform“ auf den Kopf gestellt haben. Die Reformen haben die korporatistischen Verhandlungszwänge gelockert und die Märkte dereguliert – nicht nur die Arbeitsmärkte, sondern auch die Märkte für Güter und Dienstleistungen, vor allem die Kapitalmärkte [.....]
"Wenig überraschend optiert Wolfgang Streeck für eine Umkehr des Trends zur Entdemokratisierung. Das bedeutet, „Institutionen aufzubauen, mit denen Märkte wieder unter soziale Kontrolle gebracht werden können: Märkte für Arbeit, die Platz lassen für soziales Leben, Märkte für Güter, die die Natur nicht zerstören, Märkte für Kredit, die nicht zur massenhaften Produktion uneinlösbarer Versprechen werden.“ Aber die konkrete Schlussfolgerung, die er aus seiner Diagnose zieht, ist umso überraschender. Es ist nicht der demokratische Ausbau einer auf halbem Wege stehen gebliebenen Union, der das aus den Fugen geratene Verhältnis von Politik und Markt wieder in eine demokratieverträgliche Balance bringen soll. Wolfgang Streeck empfiehlt Rückbau statt Aufbau. Er möchte zurück in die national-staatliche Wagenburg der 60er und 70er Jahre, um „die Reste jener politischen Institutionen so gut wie möglich zu verteidigen und instand zu setzen, mit deren Hilfe es vielleicht gelingen könnte, Marktgerechtigkeit durch soziale Gerechtigkeit zu modifizieren und zu ersetzen.“ Überraschend ist diese nostalgische Option für eine Einigelung in der souveränen Ohnmacht der überrollten Nation angesichts der epochalen Umwandlung von Nationalstaaten, die ihre territorialen Märkte noch unter Kontrolle hatten, zu depotenzierten Mitspielern, die ihrerseits in globalisierte Märkte eingebettet sind. [.....]
[......] Wolfgang Streeck teilt die Annahme, dass sich die egalitäre Substanz der rechtsstaatlichen Demokratie nur auf der Grundlage nationaler Zusammen-gehörigkeit und daher in den territorialen Grenzen eines Nationalstaates verwirklichen lässt, weil sonst die Majorisierung von Minderheitskulturen unvermeidlich sei. Ganz abgesehen von der umfangreichen Diskussion über kulturelle Rechte, ist diese Annahme, wenn man sie aus der Langzeit-perspektive betrachtet, willkürlich. Bereits Nationalstaaten stützen sich auf die höchst artifizielle Gestalt einer Solidarität unter Fremden, die durch den rechtlich konstruierten Staatsbürgerstatus erzeugt wird. Auch in ethnisch und sprachlich homogenen Gesellschaften ist das Nationalbewusstsein nichts Naturwüchsiges, sondern ein administrativ gefördertes Produkt von Geschichts-schreibung, Presse, allgemeiner Wehrpflicht usw. An dem Nationalbewusstsein heterogener Einwanderungsgesellschaften zeigt sich exemplarisch, dass jede Population die Rolle einer „Staatsnation“ übernehmen kann, die vor dem Hintergrund einer geteilten politischen Kultur zu einer gemeinsamen politischen Willensbildung fähig ist."
See a preview of Wolfgang Streeck's book here.
The review is titled "Demokratie oder Kapitalismus. Vom Elend der nationalstaatlichen Fragmentierung in einer kapitalistisch integrierten Weltgesellschaft" (Blätter, pp. 59-70).
Excerpts
"In seinem Buch über die vertagte Krise des demokratischen Kapitalismus entwickelt Wolfgang Streeck eine schonungslose Analyse der Entstehungs-geschichte der gegenwärtigen, auf die Realwirtschaft durchschlagenden Banken- und Schuldenkrise. [.....] Den Ausgangspunkt bildet die berechtigte Kritik an der von Claus Offe und mir Anfang der 70er Jahre entwickelten Krisentheorie. Der damals vorherrschende keynesianische Steuerungs-optimismus hatte uns zu der Annahme inspiriert, dass sich die politisch beherrschten wirtschaftlichen Krisenpotentiale in widersprüchliche Imperative an einen überforderten Staatsapparat und in "kulturelle Widersprüche des Kapitalismus" (wie es Daniel Bell einige Jahre später formulierte) verschieben und in der Gestalt einer Legitimationskrise äußern würden. Heute begegnen wir (noch ?) keiner Legitimations-, aber einer handfesten Wirtschaftskrise."
"Mit dem Besserwissen des historisch zurückblickenden Beobachters beginnt Wolfgang Streeck seine Darstellung des Krisenverlaufs mit einer Skizze des sozialstaatlichen Regimes, das im Nachkriegseuropa bis zum Beginn der 70er Jahre aufgebaut worden war. Darauf folgen die Phasen der Durchsetzung der neoliberalen Reformen, die ohne Rücksicht auf soziale Folgen die Verwertungs-bedingungen des Kapitals verbessert und dabei stillschweigend die Semantik des Ausdrucks „Reform“ auf den Kopf gestellt haben. Die Reformen haben die korporatistischen Verhandlungszwänge gelockert und die Märkte dereguliert – nicht nur die Arbeitsmärkte, sondern auch die Märkte für Güter und Dienstleistungen, vor allem die Kapitalmärkte [.....]
"Wenig überraschend optiert Wolfgang Streeck für eine Umkehr des Trends zur Entdemokratisierung. Das bedeutet, „Institutionen aufzubauen, mit denen Märkte wieder unter soziale Kontrolle gebracht werden können: Märkte für Arbeit, die Platz lassen für soziales Leben, Märkte für Güter, die die Natur nicht zerstören, Märkte für Kredit, die nicht zur massenhaften Produktion uneinlösbarer Versprechen werden.“ Aber die konkrete Schlussfolgerung, die er aus seiner Diagnose zieht, ist umso überraschender. Es ist nicht der demokratische Ausbau einer auf halbem Wege stehen gebliebenen Union, der das aus den Fugen geratene Verhältnis von Politik und Markt wieder in eine demokratieverträgliche Balance bringen soll. Wolfgang Streeck empfiehlt Rückbau statt Aufbau. Er möchte zurück in die national-staatliche Wagenburg der 60er und 70er Jahre, um „die Reste jener politischen Institutionen so gut wie möglich zu verteidigen und instand zu setzen, mit deren Hilfe es vielleicht gelingen könnte, Marktgerechtigkeit durch soziale Gerechtigkeit zu modifizieren und zu ersetzen.“ Überraschend ist diese nostalgische Option für eine Einigelung in der souveränen Ohnmacht der überrollten Nation angesichts der epochalen Umwandlung von Nationalstaaten, die ihre territorialen Märkte noch unter Kontrolle hatten, zu depotenzierten Mitspielern, die ihrerseits in globalisierte Märkte eingebettet sind. [.....]
[......] Wolfgang Streeck teilt die Annahme, dass sich die egalitäre Substanz der rechtsstaatlichen Demokratie nur auf der Grundlage nationaler Zusammen-gehörigkeit und daher in den territorialen Grenzen eines Nationalstaates verwirklichen lässt, weil sonst die Majorisierung von Minderheitskulturen unvermeidlich sei. Ganz abgesehen von der umfangreichen Diskussion über kulturelle Rechte, ist diese Annahme, wenn man sie aus der Langzeit-perspektive betrachtet, willkürlich. Bereits Nationalstaaten stützen sich auf die höchst artifizielle Gestalt einer Solidarität unter Fremden, die durch den rechtlich konstruierten Staatsbürgerstatus erzeugt wird. Auch in ethnisch und sprachlich homogenen Gesellschaften ist das Nationalbewusstsein nichts Naturwüchsiges, sondern ein administrativ gefördertes Produkt von Geschichts-schreibung, Presse, allgemeiner Wehrpflicht usw. An dem Nationalbewusstsein heterogener Einwanderungsgesellschaften zeigt sich exemplarisch, dass jede Population die Rolle einer „Staatsnation“ übernehmen kann, die vor dem Hintergrund einer geteilten politischen Kultur zu einer gemeinsamen politischen Willensbildung fähig ist."
See a preview of Wolfgang Streeck's book here.
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